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ARTICLES
INTER-JUDGE SENTENCING DISPARITY

AFTER BOOKER: A FIRST LOOK
Ryan W. Scott*
A centralpurpose of the Sentencing Reform Act was to reduce inter-judge
sentencing disparity, driven not by legitimate differences between offenders and
offense conduct, but by the philosophy,politics, or biases of the sentencingjudge.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, despite their well-recognized deficiencies,
succeeded in reducingthatform of unwarranteddisparity.But in a series ofdecisions from 2005 to 2007, the Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines advisory
(Booker), set a highly deferential standardfor appellate review (Gall), and explicitly authorizedjudges to reject the policy judgments of the Sentencing Commission (Kimbrough). Since then, the Commission has received extensive anecdotal
reports of a surge in inter-judge disparityat sentencing.
This Article provides the first empirical evidence of inter-judge sentencing
disparity since the Supreme Court upended federal sentencing, drawing on an
original new dataset of sentences from the District of Massachusetts-the only
district court that makes key sentencing documents available to the public. The
data indicate a clear increase in inter-judge sentencing disparity, both in sentence length and in guideline sentencingpatterns.Since Booker, Kimbrough, and
Gall, the effect of the judge on sentence length has doubled in strength. In cases
not subject to a mandatory minimum, the diference between the court's more lenient and more severe judges translates into an average of more than two years
in prison. The decisions also have altered guideline sentencing patterns. Some
"business as usual"judges continue to sentence below the guideline range at essentially the same rate as before Booker, while other 'free at last" judges now
sentence below the guideline range at triple or quadruple theirpre-Booker levels.

* Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Bloomington. The
author would like to thank the judges of the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts for adopting the public-access policy that made this Article possible. Thanks
in particular to two judges of the court, Nancy Gertner and William Young, for their assistance and encouragement. Thanks as well to participants in the Yale Law School Sentencing
Workshop, to faculty workshop participants at the Louisiana State University Law Center,
and to Amy Baron-Evans, Craig Bradley, Samuel Bray, Brian Broughman, Paul Cassell, Ken
Dau-Schmidt, Paul Hofer, Robert Lawless, Leandra Lederman, Andrew Martin, Michael
McConnell, Marc Miller, Ben Roin, Larry Solum, Michelle Spak, David Stras, and Sandra
Guerra Thompson for their comments on earlier drafts.
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In explaining the spike in inter-judge sentencing disparity, the Article casts
doubt on the conventional theories that persistent within-guideline sentencing is
the product of inertia,fear of reversal, anchoring effects, strategic behavior, or
simple laziness. Instead, it proposes that some judges actually agree with the
Guidelines' recommendations or consciously choose to impose within-range sentencesfor institutionalreasons.
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INTRODUCTION

A central purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was to reduce inter-judge sentencing disparity. Congress was concerned that similarly situated
defendants were receiving widely divergent sentences based on the philosophy,
politics, and biases of the sentencing judge. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission, were designed to
minimize that form of unwarranted disparity by designating a mandatory sentencing range, applicable to all judges, based on the circumstances of the offense and characteristics of the offender.
But in a series of decisions from 2005 to 2007, the Supreme Court upended
the federal sentencing regime. In United States v. Booker,' the Court resolved a
constitutional defect in the design of the Guidelines by rendering them "effectively advisory," leaving judges free to impose any reasonable sentence consistent with the broad purposes of punishment outlined by Congress.2 Three years
later, in Gall v. United States,3 the Court directed appellate courts to review
sentencing decisions under a "deferential abuse-of-discretion standard."A And
on the same day, in Kimbrough v. United States,5 the Court indicated that district courts are now free to sentence outside the guideline range "based solely
on policy considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines." 6
In the wake of those decisions, the Commission has received extensive
anecdotal reports of a surge in inter-judge sentencing disparity. The Department of Justice reported in a June 2010 memorandum that "[m]ore and more,
we are receiving reports from our prosecutors that in many federal courts, a defendant's sentence will largely be determined by the judicial assignment of the
case; i.e., which judge in the courthouse will conduct the sentencing."7 Attorney General Eric Holder, in a June 2009 speech on sentencing policy, issued a
call for research into whether post-Booker sentencing practices "show an increase in unwarranted sentencing disparities" based on "differences in judicial
philosophy among judges working in the same courthouse." Prosecutors
around the country echoed those concerns at the Commission's 2009-2010 re-

1. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
3. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
4. Id. at 52-53.
5. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
6. Id. at 101 (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. Memorandum from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy & Legislation,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Hon. William K. Sessions III, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2 (June 28,
2010) [hereinafter Wroblewski Memorandum], available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/
files/annual letter 2010_final_062810.pdf
8. Eric Holder, U.S. Att'y Gen., Remarks for the Charles Hamilton Houston Institute
for Race and Justice and Congressional Black Caucus Symposium: Rethinking Federal Sentencing Policy, 25th Anniversary of the Sentencing Reform Act (June 24, 2009) (transcript
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-0906241.html).
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gional hearings. 9 Patrick Fitzgerald, the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District
of Illinois, warned that Booker has "re-introduced into federal sentencing both
substantial district-to-district variations and substantial judge-to-judge variations." 10 Prosecutors have reported a similar spike in inter-judge disparity in
"nearly all districts" in the Ninth Circuit." Frank Bowman calls the Supreme
Court's decisions a "debacle,"' 2 and warns that in white-collar cases, "we're
back to a pre-guidelines era" marked by "disparity and the most potential for
disparity."' 3
Those reports, if accurate, deserve urgent attention because they implicate
Congress's core objective in reforming federal sentencing. Inter-judge sentencing disparity, in the view of sentencing reformers, offends important rule-oflaw principles, erodes respect for the courts, and undermines the deterrent effect of the criminal law. Congress, if it wishes, has several options available to
address the problem by altering the Sentencing Guidelines to resolve the constitutional defects identified by the Supreme Court.
To date, however, the evidence of an uptick in inter-judge disparity has
been strictly anecdotal. This Article addresses a critical gap in the research, offering the first empirical account of inter-judge sentencing disparity since the
Supreme Court's shake-up of federal sentencing. It does so by drawing on an
original new dataset of sentences from the District of Massachusetts, the only
district that makes key sentencing documents available to the public. The
records allow, for the first time, a study of how individual judges have responded to the federal sentencing revolution.
Analysis of those sentences reveals a clear increase in inter-judge disparity,
both in sentence length and in guideline sentencing patterns. Following the Supreme Court's decisions in Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall, the effect of the
judge on sentence length has doubled in strength.14 In cases not governed by a
mandatory minimum, the court's three most lenient judges have imposed average sentences of 25.5 months or less, while its two most severe judges have
imposed average sentences of 51.4 months or more. That stark difference translates to an average of more than two years in prison, depending on which of
9. See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
10. Patrick J. Fitzgerald, U.S. Att'y, N. Dist. Ill., Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission in the Regional Hearing on the State of Federal Sentencing 3 (Sept. 10,
2009) [hereinafter Fitzgerald Statement] (transcript available at http://www.ussc.gov/
AGENDAS/20090909/Fitzgeraldtestimony.pdf).
I1. Karin J. Immergut, U.S. Att'y, Dist. Or., Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing
Commission in the Regional Hearing on the State of Federal Sentencing 12 (May 27, 2009)
[hereinafter Immergut Statement] (transcript available at http://www.ussc.gov/
AGENDAS/20090527/Immergut testimony.pdf).
12. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American
Sentencing Law and How It Might yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 367, 368 (2010).
13. Amir Efrati, Looser Rules on Sentencing Stir Concerns About Equity, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 5, 2009, at A15.
14. See infra text accompanying note 175.
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those judges is assigned the case. 15
Similarly, the Boston data reveal that some judges have taken advantage of
their enhanced discretion to depart from the Guidelines to a far greater extent
than others. Two judges (call them "business as usual" judges) continue to impose below-guideline sentences at essentially the same rate as before Booker, as
little as 16% of the time. But four other judges (call them "free at last" judges)
now sentence below the guideline range at triple or quadruple their pre-Booker
rates, as much as 53% of the time.16 In addition, the effect of the judge on how
far sentences fall from the guideline range has more than doubled in the wake
of Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall."

These results tend to corroborate the anecdotal reports of an increase in inter-judge sentencing disparity. Yet they are necessarily tentative. As with any
study of a single district court, there is a risk that the results are not representative of sentencing trends nationwide. And because inter-judge disparity is but
one factor to consider in evaluating a sentencing system, the results do not
compel any judgment about whether the Supreme Court's decisions, on balance, have improved or worsened federal sentencing. Nonetheless, the Boston
data offer an unprecedented look at how individual judges have responded to
the Supreme Court's decisions.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the importance of interjudge sentencing disparity to Congress's reform efforts and describes the trio of
Supreme Court decisions that reshaped federal sentencing between 2005 and
2007. Despite anecdotal reports of a surge in inter-judge disparity, neither the
Commission nor other researchers have examined the effects of Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall on the sentencing patterns of individual judges.
Part II of the Article reports the empirical study. Part II.A describes the Article's unique dataset of sentences linked to individual judges. It also summarizes the Article's methods, which build on "natural experiment" studies of inter-judge disparity after the promulgation of the Guidelines. Part II.B reports
the results of the study. Details of the data and methods, as well as full reports
of the regression models, appear in the Appendix.
Part III considers possible explanations for the Article's key finding of a
spike in inter-judge sentencing disparity. It casts doubt on the conventional
theories that persistent within-guideline sentencing is the product of inertia,
fear of reversal, "anchoring" effects, strategic behavior, or simple laziness. Instead, it proposes two alternative explanations: some judges might actually
agree with the Guidelines' recommendations, or may elect to impose withinrange sentences for institutional reasons.

15. See infra Figure 5 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Table 3 and accompanying text.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL SENTENCING REFORM

Before describing the nuts and bolts of the empirical study, a brief history
of federal sentencing reform is needed, both to demonstrate the importance of
inter-judge disparity to sentencing reform, and to describe the Supreme Court
decisions that radically altered federal sentencing law from 2005 to 2007.
A.

Inter-Judge Sentencing DisparityBefore Booker
1.

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984

Until the early 1980s, criminal sentencing in the federal system was "indeterminate." Federal judges enjoyed almost entirely unfettered discretion in
choosing the type and severity of sentence. 18 Criminal statutes generally designated high maximum penalties and no minimum penalties, leaving judges free
to impose a term of probation or imprisonment of any length within a broad
range. 19 Judges were under no obligation to give reasons for the sentence imposed, 20 and appellate review of sentencing decisions was virtually nonexistent. 2 1 The theory was that judges should "individualize" sentences to serve the
rehabilitative needs of criminal defendants, "almost like a doctor or social
worker exercising clinical judgment." 22
In practice, however, indeterminate sentencing gave judges so much discretion that criminal defendants faced starkly different levels of punishment
depending on which judge happened to draw the case. For prominent scholars,
the evidence of "inter-judge sentencing disparity"-differences in sentencing
outcomes caused by the judge, rather than by legitimate differences between
offenses and offenders 23-was overwhelming. 24 Many judges had developed a

18. KATE STrrH & JosE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN

THE FEDERAL COURTS 9-11 (1998). Parole boards added an additional layer of indeterminacy
to federal sentences. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 abolished parole in the federal system.
19. Id. at 11. The federal bank robbery statute, for example, provided that an offender
"shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."
Bank Robbery Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-235, § 2(a), 48 Stat. 783, 783 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2006)); see also Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 101-02 (1943).
20. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 542,

543 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998).
21. STITH & CABRANEs, supra note 18, at 9 & 197 n.3.
22. United States v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 83 (D. Mass. 2004) (Gertner, J.);
see also Douglas A. Berman, ConceptualizingBooker, 38 ARIz. ST. L.J. 387, 389 (2006).
23. See James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before
and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & EcoN. 271, 274 (1999) (defining
"disparity" as "solely that variation caused by the identity of the decision maker"). What
counts as a "legitimate" difference between cases justifying a higher or lower sentence is, of
course, heavily contested and dependent on some underlying theory of punishment. See Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity,91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1336, 1337 (1997);
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reputation as especially harsh or lenient at sentencing, and numerous simulation
studies found wide disparity in the sentences chosen by different judges presented with identical case facts. 2 5
Reformers saw inter-judge disparity as problematic for several reasons.
One was that inter-judge disparity threatens core rule-of-law principles. Judge
Marvin Frankel, the most influential critic of indeterminate sentencing in the
1970s, called judges' unchecked discretion at sentencing "terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of law." 26 The notion
that sentences must be "individualized" was, in Frankel's view, "prima facie at
war with such concepts, at least as fundamental, as equality, objectivity, and
consistency."27 Although sentencing decisions properly take into account a
wide range of facts and considerations, no one defends the proposition that sentencing outcomes should depend on the judge's politics, personality, or biases.
Another was that inter-judge disparity erodes confidence in the courts by creating the appearance of unfairness and arbitrariness. As the Department of Justice
recently reiterated, disparities between judges over time "breed disrespect" for
courts, threatening the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. 28 During the
1970s, for example, federal corrections officials called sentencing disparity one
of the "major causes of prison riots" because it fueled anger and resentment
among prisoners. 29 Similarly, inter-judge disparity was seen as rendering the
level of punishment less certain and predictable, undermining the deterrent effect of the criminal law. 30
Michael M. O'Hear, The OriginalIntent of Uniformity in FederalSentencing, 74 U. CIN. L.
REV. 749, 749-50 (2006). But Congress concluded that inter-judge disparity, driven by judicial preferences and biases rather than offense and offender characteristics, is unwarranted.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2006) (directing judges to impose sentences so as "to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar conduct"); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 45 (1983) ("Sentencing disparities that are
not justified by differences among offenses or offenders are unfair both to offenders and to
the public.").
24. E.g., Norval Morris, Towards Principled Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REv. 267, 274
(1977).

25. See ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE
SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 36
(1974); Kevin Clancy et al., Sentence Decisionmaking: The Logic of Sentence Decisions and
the Extent and Sources of Sentence Disparity, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 524, 525-26
(1981); Shari Seidman Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence
Disparity and Its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 109, 119-24 (1975) (analyzing the recommendations of "sentencing councils" in which panels of judges not assigned to a case would
review the file and choose a sentence independently, then consult with the sentencing judge).
26. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973).

27. Id. at 10.
28. Wroblewski Memorandum, supra note 7, at 2.
29. Diamond & Zeisel, supra note 25, at I10-11 (quoting J. BENNETT, OF PRISONS AND

JUSTICE, S. Doc. No. 88-70, at 319 (1964)).
30. Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 231, 237 (1989)
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Following more than a decade of debate, Congress enacted the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984.31 A principal purpose of the Act was to reduce inter-judge
disparity in sentencing. 32 Congress concluded that, too often, similarly situated
offenders received unjustifiably disparate sentences, solely because of the preferences and biases of the judge assigned to the case. 33 To be sure, different
constituencies in Congress emphasized different aspects of the problem. Democrats expressed concern that indeterminate sentencing allowed race discrimination to flourish, while "tough on crime" Republicans frequently worried that
too many judges were unduly lenient. 34 But there was remarkable bipartisan
agreement that unfettered discretion had resulted in an intolerable level of interjudge sentencing disparity. 35
To reduce inter-judge disparity, the Act created the United States Sentencing Commission, "an independent commission in the judicial branch of the
United States." 36 The Act directed the Commission to promulgate guidelines
for use by sentencing courts in making virtually all important sentencing decisions, including whether to impose a term of imprisonment, the length of the
sentence, terms of supervised release, and whether to impose consecutive or
concurrent sentences. 37 It provided that guidelines and amendments adopted by
the Commission must be submitted to Congress for a period of review; unless
they were "modified or disapproved" by Congress, they would go into effect
automatically.38 Judges were bound to follow the Guidelines except in two circumstances (known as "departures"): (1) on the government's motion, based on
a defendant's substantial assistance to authorities; 39 and (2) in "exceptional
("These disparities not only fostered undue optimism among offenders who hoped to 'beat
the rap,' they also undermined deterrence and crime control objectives.").
31. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
and 28 U.S.C.).
32. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 1.2

(1987); Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFsTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988); see also Susan R. Klein & Jordan M.
Steiker, The Search for Equality in Criminal Sentencing, 2002 SUP. CT. REv. 223, 232-33
(describing "the reduction of unwarranted disparity in sentencing" as "Congress's stated
goal" in sentencing reform); Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New
FederalSentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 895-99 (1990).
33. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§

IAl.3 introductory cmt. (1987) ("Con-

gress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders.").
34. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 38-48.

35. The Act was co-sponsored by strange bedfellows in the Senate: Ted Kennedy and
Strom Thurmond. Id. at 38-39.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006); see also id. §§ 994, 995(a)(1). The Commission's composition and location "in the judicial branch" are unusual, and scores of federal courts struck
down the Act as unconstitutional before the Supreme Court rejected a separation of powers
challenge in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-412 (1989).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2006).
38. Id. § 994(p).
39. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§

5K1.1 (2009); see also 28 U.S.C.

HeinOnline -- 63 Stan. L. Rev. 8 2010-2011

December 2010]

SENTENCING AFTER BOOKER

9

case[s]"4 0 in which the court found aggravating or mitigating circumstances "of
a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission." 4 1 The Act compelled judges to state the reasons for each
sentence in open court, and to issue a written statement of reasons in any case
where the sentence fell outside the guideline range. 42 It also provided for appellate review of sentencing range calculations and for review of sentences outside
the guideline range for abuse of discretion. 43
2.

Mandatory Sentencing Guidelines (1987-2004)

The Commission promulgated the first Federal Sentencing Guidelines in
1987, and the mandatory guidelines regime remained essentially intact for eighteen years. During that time, the Guidelines provoked strident opposition, particularly among scholars, the defense bar, and district court judges. A chorus of
critics assailed the Guidelines for their severity,44 for their inflexibility, 45 and
for transferring too much power to prosecutors making charging and plea bargaining decisions. 46
Among the Guidelines' many failures, however, reducing inter-judge disparity was a bright spot. In the late 1990s, several studies provided strong evidence that the Guidelines had reduced inter-judge sentencing disparity, at least
to a modest degree. 4 7 These studies used a "natural experiment" technique that
focused on districts in which judges received case assignments from a common
case pool using a random case-assignment system. Each study measured inter§ 994(n) (2006).
40. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2009).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006). This was one of the provisions excised by the re-

medial opinion in Booker. See infra Part L.B.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(l)-(2) (2006).
43. Id. § 3742(a)-(b). It was not until 1996 that the Supreme Court clarified that the
standard of appellate review was "abuse of discretion." See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S.
81, 92-100 (1996). The Act's appellate review provision was excised in Booker. See infra
Part I.B.
44. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 59-64; Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe? A
Defense of the FederalSentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of FederalMandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REv. 1017, 1018 (2004).
45. See, e.g., Vincent L. Broderick, The Importance of Flexibility in Sentencing, 78
JUDICATURE 182, 182 (1995); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1719-20,
1725-27 (1992); Gerald Heaney, No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 161 (1991);
Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction:Prosecutorsas Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV.
1211, 1236 (2004); Daniel Zlotnick, The Future of Federal Sentencing Policy: Learning
Lessonsfrom Republican JudicialAppointees, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (2008).
46. Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of
Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1430 (2008).
47. See Anderson et al., supra note 23, at 303; Paul J. Hofer et al., The Effect of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 239, 241, 291, 296 (1999).
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judge sentence disparity in two time periods, before and after the Guidelines
went into effect. On the assumption that the distribution of cases was random in
each period, they attributed disparity in average sentences to the judge, and reductions in the rate of disparity to the Guidelines. 4 8
The two most prominent large-scale studies each found a measurable reduction in inter-judge sentencing disparity. The first, authored by James Anderson, Jeffrey Kling, and Kate Stith, examined a sample of cases from approximately twenty-five district offices nationwide in which the case distribution
system was deemed sufficiently random. 49 The study concluded that "Congress
successfully achieved [its] goal" of "reducing interjudge nominal sentencing
disparity," finding that in 1986-1987 the estimated expected difference in the
average length of sentence imposed by any two judges was 16% to 18%, and
that under the Guidelines in 1988-1993 that figure had fallen to 8%to 13%.50
The second, by Paul Hofer of the Sentencing Commission and two colleagues, compared a sample of cases from cities with a random case distribution system in two time periods, 1984-1985 and 1994-1995.51 Based on sentences by judges who remained on the bench during both periods, drawn from
nine cities, the study found that the identity of the sentencing judge accounted
for 2.32% of variation in sentences in the first period and 1.24% in the second,
a reduction "almost by half under the guidelines." 52 Using a larger sample from
forty-one cities in which the composition of the court had changed between periods, the study found larger reductions for most offense types-for drug offenses from 7.47% to 4.55%, and for firearm offenses from 18.08% to
14.00 0/o-but increases in inter-judge disparity for immigration and robbery offenses. 53 The authors concluded that, despite the fairly small percentage of variance attributable to judges in either period, the Guidelines had achieved
"modest success" in reducing inter-judge disparity. 54
These studies, and other similar efforts by Joel Waldfogel and Abigail
Payne, 55 offer the best available evidence of the effect of the Guidelines on in-

48. Anderson et al., supra note 23, at 291; Hofer et al., supra note 47, at 282.
49. Anderson et al., supra note 23, at 290 tbl.2.
50. Id. at 303.
51. Hofer et al., supra note 47, at 284.
52. Id. at 287. The percentages reported are derived from R-squared, a regression statistic that measures the fraction of variation in a dependent variable that is explained by the
independent variable(s).
53. Id. at 293-94.
54. Id. at 298.
55. See, e.g., A. Abigail Payne, Does Inter Judge DisparityReally Matter? An Analysis of the Effects of Sentencing Reforms in Three FederalDistrict Courts, 17 INT'L REv. L. &
ECON. 337 (1997) (using data from 1980 to 1991 for select types of cases in three federal
district courts); Joel Waldfogel, Aggregate Inter-Judge Disparity in Federal Sentencing:
Evidence from Three Districts,4 FED. SENT'G REP. 151 (1991) (using data from three different district courts from 1984 to 1987); Joel Waldfogel, Does Inter-Judge Disparity Justify
Empirically Based Sentencing Guidelines?, 18 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 293 (1998) [hereinaf-
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ter-judge sentencing disparity. Yet the authors of the studies readily acknowledge several limitations. One is that the studies do not measure the extent to
which other sources of disparity, such as greater prosecutorial discretion, may
have increased as a result of the Guidelines. 56 A second is that they could not
disentangle the effects of the Guidelines from the effects of other simultaneous
changes in sentencing, such as the enactment of mandatory minimum sentences
for drug offenses. 57 A third is that they measure only disparity in average sentence length. That approach measures a judge's "across-the-board" leniency or
severity, but does not capture other important forms of variation between
judges, like variation that depends on particular offense or offender characteristics.
3.

PROTECTAct (2003)

Despite fifteen years of vigorous criticism, Congress voted in 2003 to make
the Guidelines even tougher and less flexible. Effective May 1, 2003, Congress
enacted a package of sentencing provisions as part of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003
(PROTECT Act).59 Championed by Representative Tom Feeney and dubbed
the "Feeney Amendment," the provisions responded to concerns in Congress
and the Department of Justice about the prevalence of downward departures
from the Guidelines. 60 At the time, reports by the Commission showed strong
growth in the rate of downward departures between 1991 and 2001, from 5.8%
of all sentences to 18.1%.61 The Commission later realized that the 2001 rate
was incorrect. 62
Among other changes, the PROTECT Act (1) tightened the standard of appellate review for nonguideline sentences, replacing the abuse of discretion
standard with de novo review;63 (2) directed the Commission to amend the

ter Waldfogel, Empirically Based Sentencing] (employing a natural experiment regression
analysis using data from ten judges in San Francisco from 1984 to 1987).
56. See Anderson et al., supra note 23, at 302; Hofer et al., supra note 47, at 299-302.
57. See Anderson et al., supra note 23, at 299.
58. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
59. Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667-76 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
60. See H.R. REP. No. 108-66, at 58 (2003) (Conf. Rep.) (announcing an intention to
address "the longstanding problem of downward departures from the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines"); Stith, supra note 46, at 1465.
61. U.S.

SENTENCING COMM'N, DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE SENTENCING

GUIDELINES, at iv-v, 59-60 (2003); Stith, supra note 46, at 1465 (describing the numbers before Congress in 2003 as "powerful," showing "persistent increases in the rate of noncooperation downward departures during the 1990s-especially after the Koon decision was
handed down in 1996"); see also Miller, supra note 45, at 1228 fig.1.
62. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
63. PROTECT Act § 401(d)(2).
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Guidelines "to ensure that the incidence of downward departures are [sic] substantially reduced";64 (3) prohibited the Commission from recognizing new
permissible grounds for downward departure for two years; 65 and (4) directed
the Department of Justice to resist downward departures "not supported by the
facts and the law." 66 The PROTECT Act also directly amended the Guidelines
by adding specific upward adjustments for sex offenders and child pornography
cases. 6 7
The PROTECT Act sentencing provisions drew strong criticism from scholars, judges, interest groups, and the defense bar. 68 Responding to an earlier
version of the Act that would have eliminated all grounds for downward departure in the Guidelines, Chief Justice William Rehnquist warned Congress that
the bill "would do serious harm to the basic structure of the sentencing guideline system and would seriously impair the ability of courts to impose just and
reasonable sentences."69 The Judicial Conference of the United States took exception to the allegation that judges were driving up the rate of downward departures, noting that most of the increase was concentrated in southwestern
border districts where the justice system faced "crisis" conditions. 70
In hindsight, it is clear that reports of an epidemic of judge-initiated
downward departures were exaggerated. 7 In response to the PROTECT Act,
the Commission revealed that approximately 40% of the sentences it had reported as judge-initiated downward departures in fiscal year 2001 were in fact
government sponsored, typically due to a plea agreement or "fast track" program.72
Nonetheless, the PROTECT Act greatly curtailed judges' discretion to depart from the Guidelines. It resulted in changes to the Guidelines themselves
that narrowed the permissible circumstances for departure. And because it
toughened the standard of review, judges concerned about reversal on appeal
had strong incentives to impose within-range sentences.

64. Id. § 401(m)(2)(A).
65. Id. § 401(j)(2).
66. Id. §401(1)(1)(A).

67. Id. § 401(i).
68. See Noelle Tsigounis Valentine, Note, An Exploration of the Feeney Amendment:
The Legislation that Prompted the Supreme Court to Undo Twenty Years of Sentencing
Reform, 55 SYRACUSE L. REv. 619, 628-29 (2005).
69. Alan Vinegrad, The New FederalSentencing Law, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 310, 313
(2003).
70. See Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Sec'y, Judicial Conference of the U.S.,
to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary 3 (Apr. 3, 2003), available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/departures/$FILE/
judconf feeney.pdf.
71. Max Schanzenbach, Have Federal Judges Changed Their Sentencing Practices?
The Shaky EmpiricalFoundationsof the Feeney Amendment, 2 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 1, 1
(2005); Stith, supra note 46, at 1464-65.
72. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 61, at iv.
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The Booker Revolution, 2005-2007

1. Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall
In January 2005, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Booker 73 that
the Sentencing Reform Act violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury.74 The Court's fractured decision consisted of two majority opinions.
One opinion, written by Justice Stevens, extended the rule of Apprendi v. New
Jersey76 and Blakely v. Washington77 to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
The Court held that, because the Guidelines permitted judges to find facts that
trigger a sentence above the otherwise-applicable guideline maximum, they intruded upon the province of the jury.
The second majority opinion, written by Justice Breyer, held that the proper remedy for the Sixth Amendment violation was to sever two provisions of
the Sentencing Reform Act that made the Guidelines mandatory. 7 9 Excising
those provisions, the Court explained, "makes the Guidelines effectively advisory."80 Judges must continue to calculate the applicable sentencing range, the
Court explained, but need only "consider" it, along with the factors identified in
§ 3553(a), in imposing a sentence. 1
Two subsequent decisions, issued on the same day in December 2007, clarified the role of appellate courts reviewing sentences for "reasonableness" and
left no doubt that Booker had dramatically expanded the discretion of district
8
the Court held that courts of
courts at sentencing. 82 In Gall v. United States,83
appeals may not insist upon "extraordinary" circumstances to justify a sentence
outside the guideline range and rejected the use of a "rigid mathematical formula" to determine the strength of the justifications required for the particular sen-

73. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
74. Id. at 226-27, 243-44.
75. The case prompted six separate opinions, including two principal majorities and
two principal dissents. Id. at 225.
76. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
77. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
78. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
79. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 245, 259-60.
82. See Ryan Scott Reynolds, Note, Equal Justice Under Law: Post-Booker, Should
FederalJudges Be Able to Departfrom the FederalSentencing Guidelines to Remedy Disparity Between Codefendants' Sentences?, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 538, 560, 563-64 (2009)
(noting that both cases expanded district courts' discretion and that some courts of appeals
have responded by reconsidering their treatment of particular sentencing factors); The Supreme Court, 2007 Term-Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REv. 276, 333 (2008) (asserting
that Kimbrough and Gall "appear to loosen the hold of the Guidelines").
83. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
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tence. 84 Instead, appellate courts must apply a "deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard," according due respect to "the district court's decision that the
§ 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance [from the
Guidelines]." 8 5
Simultaneously in Kimbrough v. United States,86 the Court held that
judges, in applying the now-advisory Guidelines, are free to reject the Guidelines' 100-to-i ratio that treats one gram of crack cocaine as equivalent to one
hundred grams of powder cocaine. 87 In reaching that conclusion, the Court relied upon-and seemed to endorse-the government's concession that "as a
general matter, courts may vary from Guidelines ranges based solely on policy
considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines."8 8 Although it
suggested that "closer review may be in order" in those circumstances, the
Court left little doubt that judges now enjoy the freedom to categorically reject
90
the Commission's judgments about sentencing policy.
2.

Average sentence length and guideline sentencing

Longtime critics of the Guidelines greeted Booker with enthusiasm, 91 but
the decision did not prompt immediate changes in sentencing outcomes. Average sentence length actually increased for several years after Booker,92 even for
drug trafficking offenses. The rate of below-guideline sentencing jumped, but
quickly leveled out, and the change was hardly "earth-shattering." 93 Many
84. Id. at 47.
85. Id. at 51-52.
86. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
87. Id. at 109-10.
88. Id. at 101-02 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 16, Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (No.
06-6330)) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
89. Id. at 109.

90. See, e.g., United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 584-85 (6th Cir. 2009)
(interpreting Kimbrough as recognizing "the broad authority of sentencing judges" to "categorically reject the sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines" (quoting Spears v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 844 (2009))).
91. For a collection of initial reactions, see Erik Luna & Barton Poulson, Restorative
Justice in FederalSentencing: An Unexpected Benefit of Booker?, 37 MCGEORGE L. REv.
787, 787-88 (2006). Two federal judges in the District of Massachusetts publicly praised
Booker shortly after it was announced. See Shelley Murphy, Two Boston Jurists Hail Return
ofDiscretion, BOsTON GLOBE, Jan. 13, 2005, at A20.
92. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BooKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING, at vii (2006) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], available at

http://www.ussc.gov/booker report/BookerReport.pdf (documenting a modest increase in
average sentence length and concluding that "[t~he severity of sentences imposed has not
changed substantially").
93. Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 715, 739
(2008); see also Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal
System, 43 Hous. L. REv. 341, 349 (2006) ("[D]ata on post-Booker sentencing outcomes re-
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commentators lamented that, far from ushering in a revolution, the decision
turned out to be a dud.94
It would be premature to pronounce the Supreme Court's sentencing decisions a nonevent. Recent data from the Commission suggest that Kimbrough
and Gall have, after a long delay, prompted meaningful changes in sentencing
outcomes. As shown in Figure 1, average sentence length has reversed course,
decreasing after Kimbrough and Gall.

leased by the Commission reveal only relatively small changes in the patterns of sentencing
outcomes.").
94. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 93, at 739 (noting that "most observers"
believe "the fundamentals of sentencing changed little post-Booker"); see also Berman, supra note 93, at 348 ("[T]he Booker decision does not appear to have radically transformed
either basic practices or typical outcomes in the federal sentencing system."); Frank 0.
Bowman, III, The Year ofJubilee ... or Maybe Not: Some PreliminaryObservations About

the Operation of the Federal Sentencing System After Booker, 43 Hous. L. REV. 279, 319
(2006) (calling the changes "strikingly modest"); D. Michael Fisher, Striking a Balance: The
Need To Temper JudicialDiscretion Against a Background ofLegislative Interest in Federal
Sentencing, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 65, 77-78 (2007) ("While the change is noticeable, it does not
reflect the fear of some post-Booker commentators that judges, now invested with a new
kind of discretion, would ignore the Guidelines and sentence defendants however they saw
fit."); Jeffrey S. Hurd, Federal Sentencing and the Uncertain Future of Reasonableness Review, 84 DEN. U. L. REv. 835, 860 (2007); Michael M. O'Hear, The Duty To Avoid Disparity: Implementing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) After Booker, 37 McGEORGE L. REv. 627, 645
(2006); Zlotnick, supra note 45, at 15.
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FIGURE 1
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Average sentence length nationwide rose from 50.1 months in fiscal year
2004, immediately before Booker, to 51.8 months in fiscal years 2006 and
2007. But since Kimbrough and Gall, average sentence length has fallen to 46.8
months. Similarly, sentences for drug trafficking offenses rose from 81.3
months in fiscal year 2004, before Booker, to 83.2 months after Booker in fiscal
year 2007. Drug trafficking sentences declined after Kimbrough and Gall, however, decreasing to 77.9 months in fiscal year 2009. They are now less severe
than before Booker.
95. The data for this Figure comes from table 13 in the 2000-2009 editions of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission's Sourcebook of FederalSentencing Statistics and table 19 in the
2006-2009 editions of the Commission's 4th Quarter PreliminaryData Reports. The fiscal
year 2004 period ends on June 24, 2004, the date of the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely
v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). FNAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 71 tbl.3.
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Another measure is sentencing relative to the guideline range. Figure 2
shows the rate of above-range and below-range sentencing among all judges
nationwide from fiscal years 2003-2009.
FIGURE 2
Guideline Sentencing, by Fiscal Year 96
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The rate of below-range sentencing more than doubled after Booker in fiscal year 2005, from 5.5% to 13.0%, but retreated to 12.0% by fiscal year 2007,
compared with the 8.6% rate under the mandatory Guidelines in 2002-2003.
After Kimbrough and Gall, however, the increase in below-range sentencing
has resumed, reaching 15.9% in fiscal year 2009. Preliminary data for the first
half of fiscal year 2010 indicate that the rate of below-range sentencing has
jumped to 16.9%.97 That means the rate of below-range sentencing is creeping
close to the (incorrectly reported) 18.1% rate that prompted Congress to intervene with the PROTECT Act. 98 The percentage of above-range sentences also
has more than doubled, from 0.8% before Booker to 1.8% after Kimbrough and
Gall.
96. The data for this Figure come from figure G and table N in the 2000-2009 editions
of the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics and table I in the 2006-2009 editions of the Commission's 4th QuarterPreliminaryData Reports.
See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 92, app. E-1. Percentages for all post-Booker periods
combine traditional departures with nonguideline sentences based on the § 3553(a) factors
(sometimes called "variances").
97. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 1 tbl. 1 (2010),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/sc-cases/USSC_2010_QuarterReport_2nd.pdf.
98. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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Still, the changes in sentencing outcomes since Booker have fallen far short
of the fundamental change many scholars expected. Average sentence length
stands at approximately 2000-2003 levels, while drug trafficking sentences remain substantially above 2002-2003 levels. Within-range and governmentsponsored sentences continue to account for more than 80% of sentences in the
federal system.
Why has the response to Booker been relatively modest? The conventional
wisdom, reflecting impatience with the pace of change, has focused on several
explanations: inertia, risk aversion, anchoring, strategic behavior, and laziness.
The most common conventional explanation for the slow response to
Booker is inertia. Three-quarters of district court judges in active status, and
more than half of all sitting district court judges, were appointed between the
effective date of the Guidelines in 1987 and the Booker decision in 2005.99 It
should not be surprising, the argument goes, that judges who have spent their
entire careers treating the Guidelines as mandatory continue to follow them in
the great majority of cases even though they are now advisory. 0 0
A second explanation is risk aversion among judges worried about reversal. The Guidelines are now advisory, but sentences remain subject to appellate
review for "reasonableness."' 0 1 In Rita v. United States,102 the Supreme Court
held that courts of appeals may presume that a within-guideline sentence is reasonable. 103 A judge anxious to avoid having a sentence vacated on appeal
therefore has an incentive to stay within the Guidelines. 104

99. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsflpage/judges.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2008). There are
1016 sitting federal district court judges, including 651 judges in active status. Of them, 593
judges (58%), including 506 in active status (78%), were appointed between the effective
date of the first Sentencing Guidelines on November 1, 1987 and the Booker decision on
January 12, 2005.
100. See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y
REV. 261, 270 (2009) (describing continued guideline sentencing as the result of "the habits
ingrained during twenty years of mandatory Guideline sentencing," and noting that "after the
SRA, judges were trained only in the Guidelines"); Stith, supra note 46, at 1496-97 (concluding that "the gravitational pull of the Guidelines on the pendulum of sentencing practice
remains strong" based, in part, on the "reluctan[ce]" of "incumbent sentencing decision
makers" who were obliged to follow the Guidelines for two decades).
101. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 263-64 (2004) (Breyer, J., delivering the
opinion of the Court in part).
102. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
103. Id. at 347.
104. Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 137, 140 (2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/images/pdfs/50.pdf
(describing decisions of appellate courts that reinforce the Guidelines and reporting that
"[d]istrict judges have gotten the message"); Jack King, Up, Down or Lazy? PanelistsDiscuss Federal Sentencing After Rita, CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 8-9; see also Kevin R.
Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 155, 171 (2005) (concluding that the post-Booker Guidelines "remain as restrictive of judicial sentencing discretion as any system in the United States"). The incentive against departure from the Guide-
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A third proposed explanation is "anchoring," the well-documented cognitive error in which decision makers begin with an initial value, even one that is
irrational, and fail to make rational adjustments.10 5 One study has shown, in an
experimental setting, that starting values provided to a person choosing a sentence may influence the final result, even if the test subject knows that the initial value is arbitrary.10 6 Presumably sentencing guidelines, which judges know
to be nonarbitrary, will have an even stronger influence. Because the Court has
emphasized that the Guidelines continue to serve as "the starting point and the
initial benchmark" for every federal sentence, 107 it should not be surprising if
the Guidelines continue to exert a powerful influence despite being advisory. 0 8
A fourth proposed explanation is strategic behavior. The idea is that
judges, eager to safeguard the sentencing discretion they gained in Booker,
have taken a "go slow" approach to reduce the risk of interbranch retaliation.109
On this theory, judges secretly desire to sentence outside the Guidelines more
often, but have restrained themselves to avoid provoking Congress.10
A final explanation is laziness. Some commentators have suggested, rather
uncharitably, that judges find it easier to impose within-range sentences because it requires "less time in thought and less stress." 1 l As one judge put it, a
judge "who wants to be a lazy judge, will be able to do it very easily" by staying within the Guidelines.112
3.

Inter-judge sentencingdisparity

As commentators have puzzled over the fairly modest changes in sentencing outcomes, anecdotal reports from around the country have warned of a
surge in inter-judge sentencing disparity in the wake of Booker, Kimbrough,
lines was at least as strong before Booker. See Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and
the ContinuingRise of ProsecutorialPower to Plea Bargain,94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
295, 302 (2004).
105. Gertner, supra note 100, at 270; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of
Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1188 (1997); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty:Heuristicsand Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128-30 (1974).
106. See Birte Englich et al., Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences: The Influence of
Irrelevant Anchors on Experts' Judicial Decision Making, 32 PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 188, 194 (2006).

107. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
108. Gertner, supra note 104, at 138; Stith, supra note 46, at 1496.
109. See Zlotnick, supra note 45, at 14-15; Daniel A. Chatham, Note, Playing with
Post-Booker Fire: The Dangers of Increased JudicialDiscretion in Federal White-Collar
Sentencing, 32 J. CORP. L. 619, 637-38 (2007) (recommending this approach).
10. Cf Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of by, and for the
People: Notesfor the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOzO L. REv. 1, 211 (2008). On
this theory, the change in party control of Congress in 2006 and the White House in 2008
could embolden district court judges to depart more frequently.
111. Id.

112. King, supra note 104, at 9 (quoting Judge Myron Thompson).
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and Gall. At its regional hearings in 2009-2010, the Commission heard extensive testimony from prosecutors that sentencing outcomes increasingly depend
on which judge is assigned to the case. The U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, Patrick Fitzgerald, told the Commission that Booker has "reintroduced into federal sentencing both substantial district-to-district variations
and substantial judge-to-judge variations." 1 1 3 A survey of other districts in the
Ninth Circuit revealed that "nearly all emphasize the wide variation seen between different judges within their districts."1 1 4 In the Eastern District of New
York, it appears "the range of variation between judges in [the same] courthouse has grown" since Booker.11 5 In Oregon, "sentencing tendencies have always been somewhat unique to each individual judge, but the differences since
Booker have become more pronounced.""' 6 In the Eastern District of Virginia,
some judges "are more inclined to use the freedom granted by Booker and its
progeny" than others. 117 Summing up its position in a July 2010 memorandum,
the Department of Justice reported that "[m]ore and more, we are receiving reports from our prosecutors that in many federal courts, a defendant's sentence
will largely be determined by . .. which judge in the courthouse will conduct
the sentencing.""1 8
Those claims, if accurate, deserve urgent attention. Congress's central objective in reforming federal sentencing was to reduce inter-judge disparity,' 1 9
and on that score the mandatory Guidelines can claim success. If Booker has
compromised that progress, Congress could take corrective action. Consistent
with the Court's Sixth Amendment cases, Congress has several options for
avoiding the constitutional problem.120 The most straightforward, charted by
Justice Stevens in his dissent from the remedial opinion in Booker, is to "Blakely-ize" the Guidelines by affording criminal defendants a jury trial right with
respect to aggravating factors that increase the otherwise-applicable guideline
maximum.121 Some state guideline systems have followed that approach,1 22
113. Fitzgerald Statement, supra note 10, at 3.
114. Immergut Statement, supra note 11, at 12 (warning that "the signs point to increasing sentencing disparity-including disparity based on differing judicial philosophies among
judges working in the same courthouse").
115. Benton J. Campbell, U.S. Att'y, E. Dist. N.Y., Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission in the Regional Hearing on the State of Federal Sentencing 8 (July 9, 2009)
(transcript available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20090709/Campbell testimony
.pdf).
116. Immergut Statement, supra note 11, at 6 (reporting that some judges "continue to
follow the advisory guideline sentence in the majority of cases" while "other judges routinely decline to impose a guideline sentence").
117. Dana Boente, U.S. Att'y, E. Dist. Va., Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing
Commission in the Regional Hearing on the State of Federal Sentencing 3 (July 9, 2009)
(transcript available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20090709/Boente-testimony.pdf).
118. Wroblewski Memorandum, supra note 7, at 2.
119. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
120. For an overview of proposed reforms, see Berman, supra note 93, at 356-71.
121. Id. at 364-65 (discussing proposals to "Blakely-ize" the Guidelines); see also Unit-
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and the American Law Institute is poised to recommend it as part of the new
Model Penal Code provisions on sentencing. 123
Yet claims of an uptick in inter-judge sentencing disparity are exceedingly
difficult to evaluate because the changes are almost impossible to detect. Consistent with its longstanding policy, the Commission has reported only aggregate data on post-Booker sentencing trends. Neither the Commission nor any
independent researcher has examined how individualjudges have responded to
Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall.

That is a critical omission, and it has not gone unnoticed. Because a central
goal of the Sentencing Reform Act was the reduction of inter-judge sentencing
disparity, judge-specific data are needed to determine the extent to which
Booker has advanced or undermined Congress's objectives. Attorney General
Eric Holder, in a June 2009 speech marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
Sentencing Reform Act, called for an assessment of whether post-Booker sentencing practices "show an increase in unwarranted sentencing disparities"
based on "differences in judicial philosophy among judges working in the same
courthouse."l24 Existing research by the Commission does not permit such an
assessment, leaving an important gap in our understanding of federal sentencing patterns.
II.

THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF INTER-JUDGE SENTENCING DISPARITY

This Article provides the first hard evidence of inter-judge sentencing disparity after the Supreme Court's decisions in Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall. It
overcomes the primary challenge in studying federal sentencing patterns-the
lack of data that include the identity of the sentencing judge-by drawing on a
unique new dataset of more than 2200 cases from the District of Massachusetts,
the lone federal district court that publicizes critical sentencing documents.
Those records afford a rare opportunity to test how Booker has affected interjudge sentencing disparity, both in sentence length and in guideline sentencing
patterns.
A. Data and Methods
1. Judge-specific data

The most frustrating obstacle to the study of federal sentencing is the unavailability of data that include the identity of the sentencing judge. Despite its
statutory responsibilities for collecting and disseminating information about
ed States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 276-79, 284-85 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
122. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(b) (West 2010).
123. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.07B(2) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).

124. Holder, supra note 8.
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federal sentencing,1 25 the Commission removes all judge-identifying information from the data it releases to judges, scholars, and the public. 126 The Commission not only withholds the name of the sentencing judge, but does not provide a code or number that would permit analysis of judges' sentencing patterns
while keeping their identities confidential. 121 With the exception of studies by
the Commission and its staff, the Anderson-Kling-Stith study marks the only
time in over twenty-five years that scholars have received permission to study
case records that identify the sentencing judges.12 8
The Commission's policy can be traced to the Judicial Conference of the
United States, which on behalf of federal judges extracted a promise of secrecy
from the Commission as a condition of supplying basic sentencing records. 129
Ostensibly, the purpose of the policy is to prevent the release of defendant information, but sensitive personal data are already removed from the Commission's data releases. More likely, federal judges simply wish to shield themselves from criticism-an astonishing expectation for public officials who
enjoy life tenure. The policy has been roundly criticized by scholars, 130 and
even some judges.131 I join the chorus calling for the Commission to promote
transparency and facilitate the study of federal sentencing by releasing sentencing data that include judge-specific information.1 32
This study overcomes that obstacle by drawing on a unique new dataset of
more than 2200 sentences from the District of Massachusetts. The data were

125. See 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(12)-(16) (2006).
126. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDE TO PUBLICATIONS & RESOURCES 2007-2008, at

45 (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/Cat2005.pdf ("Pursuant to the policy
on public access to Sentencing Commission documents and data, all case and defendant
identifiers have been removed from the data." (internal citation omitted)).
127. The Feeney Amendment authorized Congress or the Justice Department to request
data that include the identity of the sentencing judge, but did not provide for public dissemination of that information. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(3)-(4) (2006).
128. See Anderson et al., supra note 23, at 287.
129. See Public Access to Sentencing Commission Documents and Data, 54 Fed. Reg.
51,279, 51,282 (Dec. 13, 1989).
130. Mark H. Bergstrom & Joseph S. Mistick, The Pennsylvania Experience: Public
Release ofJudge-Specific Sentencing Data, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 57, 63 (2003) (noting that
Pennsylvania now releases judge-identifying information and that "[m]any of the negative
outcomes predicted during the development of the policy have not materialized"); Marc L.
Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compassfor Judges: Sentencing Information Systems,
Transparency, and the Next Generationof Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1351, 1356 n.19,
1385 (2005).
131. See, e.g., Richard G. Kopf, A Brief and Modest Proposal, SENT'G L. & POL'Y (Ju-

ly 28, 2010, 5:19 PM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing law and-Policy/2010/
07/a-brief-and-modest-proposal-an-original-essay-from-us-district-judeg-richard-kopf-.html.
132. See Miller, supra note 130, at 1356 & n.19; Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Reform
"Reform" Through Sentencing Information Systems, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 121,

146-48 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004); Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 93, at 741-42; Steven
L. Chanenson, Write On!, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 146, 147 (2006),
http://www.thepocketpart.org/images/pdfs/l.pdf.
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gathered using a method, pioneered by Max Schanzenbach and Emerson Tiller,133 that matches publicly available docket information with corresponding
information in the Commission's case records. Changes in the Commission's
data-disclosure practices in 2004 make the case-matching method far less effective for cases decided after Booker.134 But sentencing documents disclosed by
the District of Massachusetts-and no other federal court-make it possible to
generate a rich dataset of post-Booker sentences from that district.
By special vote of the court in 2001, the District of Massachusetts now
makes public a case document called the "Statement of Reasons." This document is available online for every criminal sentence, unless the presiding judge
orders it sealed.1 35 The Statement of Reasons, which must be completed and
submitted to the Commission for every sentence, reports a host of details about
the sentence, including the offender's offense level, criminal history category,
and guideline range, as well as any statutory minimum sentence, and the basis
for any departure.13 6 Those additional data points greatly improve the efficiency and reliability of the case-matching process. The district's extraordinary policy, which apparently defies a contrary policy statement by the Judicial Conference,137 reflects the court's commitment to greater openness and transparency
in sentencing decisions. As former Chief Judge William Young has observed,
"[t]he District of Massachusetts is a shining exception to the prevailing secrecy
about sentencing."' 38
Aided by the information in the Statements of Reasons, the case-matching
method proved highly effective. Based on docket information for cases in the
district's Boston division, I generated a dataset of 2659 sentences imposed
between October 1, 2001, and September 30, 2008.139

133. Schanzenbach & Tiller,supra note 93, at 729-30.
134. Specifically, the Commission no longer reports the date of sentencing, but instead
reports only the month and year, greatly increasing the chance that multiple cases in the
Commission's data will match publicly available docket information for a given case. See
infra note 242.
135. United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 277 n.66 (D. Mass. 2004) (Young,
C.J.) (citing Minutes of the Court Meeting of the District of Massachusetts 4 (Sept. 4,
2001)). Judges may order the Statement of Reasons sealed for case-specific reasons, id., such
as the protection of a defendant who cooperated with authorities. In practice, judges rarely
order the Statement of Reasons sealed, minimizing the risk of selection bias. I encountered
fewer than five cases (out of more than 2200 total coded) in which the Statement of Reasons
was unavailable.
136. The documents are also a gold mine of qualitative data. Many judges attach transcripts from the sentencing hearing or write narrative descriptions of their reasons, offering a
rare glimpse of how judges are sentencing-on a day-to-day basis in ordinary, unreported
cases-after Booker.
137. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 17 (2001).

138. United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282, 332 n.76 (D. Mass. 2006)
(Young, J.).
139. Details of the case-matching technique are set forth in Part A.2 of the Appendix.
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Throughout the Article, I use letters rather than names to identify judges.
Identifying judges by name is unnecessary because inter-judge disparity is a
concern regardless of which particular judges reached inconsistent results. 14 0
Also, the Administrative Office's reticence to release judge-identifying information reflects concerns that individual judges will be subject to "unfair criticism" based on "isolated cases."1 4 1 Although I see no reason why federal
judges who enjoy life tenure cannot withstand criticism-even "unfair" criticism--of their decisions, this Article illustrates that judge-identifying information can enable valuable research without targeting individual judges.
2.

Natural experiment method

Building on previous studies of inter-judge sentencing disparity, this study
employs a natural experiment method. Unlike a controlled experiment, in
which researchers themselves change a condition to study its effects, a natural
experiment examines the effects of exogenous changes that occur in the world
without any prompting by researchers, such as the enactment of a new law or a
series of Supreme Court decisions. Because all federal judges are equally
bound by the Supreme Court's decisions in Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall, there
is no control group of judges unaffected by recent changes in sentencing law.
Researchers can capture changes in inter-judge disparity over time, however,
by taking before-and-after measurements from a group of judges who share a
random case-assignment system and a common case pool.1 42 Assuming each
judge hears a sufficient number of cases, and the distribution of cases is truly
random, then average sentencing outcomes for each judge should be the same.
Inter-judge variation in average outcomes is properly attributed to the judge,
rather than case-specific considerations, because the average reflects a random
cross-section of the common case pool.
Accordingly, two types of sentences were excluded from the initial set.
First, to ensure a sufficient number of cases per judge to draw reliable conclusions from average sentencing outcomes, judges who did not satisfy minimum
caseload requirements were excluded.1 43 Second, to ensure that sentencing outcomes were the product of random distribution, the dataset was narrowed to
judges sitting in Boston who drew their cases from the shared Boston case
wheel. The court's rules provide for distribution of cases "by lot" within the di-

140. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
141. See Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, supra note
70, at 3.
142. Anderson et al., supra note 23, at 290-91; Hofer et al., supra note 47, at 282.
143. Specifically, sentences were excluded if the sentencing judge was on pace to impose fewer than twenty-five sentences in a two-year period. Cf Anderson et al., supra note
23, at 288 (using a cutoff of thirty cases, including jurisdictional transfers and acquittals, in a
two-year period).
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vision that includes Boston,144 and statistical tests indicate that cases were indeed distributed randomly. 145
The result is a large dataset of 2262 sentences imposed by ten judges, all in
active status, who served side-by-side in Boston continuously from 2001 to
2008.146 Judges included in the study had between 175 and 264 sentences during that period, an average of 226 sentences per judge. The dataset is not a
sample of sentences during that time, but accounts for more than 90% of sentences matching the selection criteria. 147
An important assumption of the natural experiment method is that changes
in sentencing outcomes are exogenous, caused by developments in sentencing
law rather than on-the-ground factors in Boston. An analysis of the mixture of
cases in the Boston pool does not suggest any meanin fil change in the type of
offenders sentenced during the relevant time period. 4
3.

Measures of inter-judge disparity

In research on inter-judge sentencing disparity, a foundational design question is how to measure average sentencing outcomes. Previous natural experiment studies have relied exclusively on sentence length. This Article supplements that measure by also examining sentencing relative to the sentencing
range under the Guidelines.
The most basic measure of sentencing outcomes is sentence length. The
Hofer, Anderson-Kling-Stith, and Waldfogel studies measured sentencing outcomes using a single metric: average prison term, in months. 14 9 This study uses
the same measure. 150 Linear regression models can analyze inter-judge disparity in sentence length by calculating the percentage of variance in sentence
length explained by the judge assigned to the case. 15 1
To capture changes in inter-judge disparity over time, this study performs
that analysis during three time periods:
1. Pre-Booker: October 1, 2001 - June 23, 2004 (z 33 months)
2. Post-Booker: January 12, 2005 - December 9, 2007 (z 35 months)

144. D. MASS. LOCAL R. 40.1(B)(3) (2008).
145. See infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.

146. For a detailed breakdown of the sentence count for each judge, see Table A2.
147. See infra note 241 & Table Al and accompanying text.
148. See infra Table A3 and accompanying text.
149. See Anderson et at., supra note 23, at 281; Hofer et al., supra note 47, technical
app. at 307-09; Waldfogel, Empirically Based Sentencing, supra note 55, at 294. Consistent
with the Sentencing Commission's convention, sentences of probation are coded as zero
months of imprisonment. See Hofer et al., supra note 47, technical app. at 307-09; see also
STrrH & CABRANES, supranote 18, at 62 (following the same convention).
150. Sentence length is measured as a term of imprisonment in months. Following the
Sentencing Commission, a sentence of probation is coded as zero months of imprisonment.
151. See infra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
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3. Kimbrough/Gall: December 10, 2007 - September 30, 2008 (Z 10
months)152
Changes over time in the percentage of variance explained by the judge indicate increases or decreases in inter-judge sentencing disparity.
In addition, this study examines sentence length in the subset of cases not
subject to a mandatory minimum sentence. As previous researchers have recognized, mandatory minimums may interfere with accurate assessment of interjudge sentencing disparity by creating the illusion of inter-judge consistency.
To guard against that risk, the Hofer study recommended that future researchers
"exclude cases where mandatory minimum statutes truncate the [sentencing]
range."1 53 This study follows that recommendation by separately analyzing
cases not governed by a mandatory minimum, which account for 66.7% of sentences in the dataset.
A second measure of sentencing outcomes is sentencing relative to the
guideline range. Disparity in average sentence length provides an incomplete
picture because it captures only judges' general tendency toward leniency or
severity, sometimes called the "primary judge effect."1 54 It does not capture
other forms of inter-judge disparity linked to particular offense or offender characteristics. 155 This study therefore supplements that measure by analyzing inter-judge disparity in guideline sentencing. Using the Guidelines as a reference
point does not suggest or assume that the guideline sentencing range is "correct" or just.156 But it measures a distinct form of inter-judge disparity, driven
by differences in judges' reactions to the Guidelines themselves. Indeed, anecdotal reports from prosecutors have focused on this form of disparity, warning
that some judges routinely sentence within the guideline range, while others
routinely sentence below the range.' 57
The study analyzes guideline sentencing outcomes in part through a
straightforward description of changes in sentencing patterns over time. It also
analyzes howfar, on average, each judge sentences from the Guidelines by calculating average distance from the guideline range. 1 58 Again, linear regression
152. Because the Commission has not yet released sentencing data for fiscal year 2009
and beyond, the Kimbrough/Gall period, of necessity, is shorter than the other periods. For a
full discussion of period selection issues, see infra notes 232-37 and accompanying text.
153. Hofer et al., supra note 47, at 275 n.103.
154. Id. at 240-4 1; see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 119.
155. Hofer et al., supra note 47, at 240-41; see also STrrH & CABRANES, supra note 18,
at 119 (acknowledging "[a] possibility that comparing each judge's average sentence masks
considerable variability within each set of sentences"); Hofer et al., supra note 47, at 296
(calling judge-to-judge disparity in average sentence length "the tip of the disparity iceberg").
156. See Bowman, supra note 94, at 296.
157. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
158. Average distance from the guideline range is calculated using all of the judge's
sentences, treating within-range sentences as zero months. See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
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models can determine the percentage of variance in that metric explained by the
judge. Because guideline sentencing patterns are highly sensitive to changes in
the law governing departures, this study performs both types of analysis during
five time periods:
1. Mandatory Guidelines: October 1, 2001 - April 30, 2003 (z 19
months)
2. PROTECT Act: May 1, 2003 - June 23, 2004 (z 14 months)
3. Post-Booker 1: January 12, 2005 - June 30, 2006 (z 18 months)
4. Post-Booker II: July 1, 2006 - December 9, 2007 (z 17 months)
5. Kimbrough/Gall: December 10, 2007 - September 30, 2008 (z 10

months)1 59
As a final measure of guideline sentencing patterns, the study examines a
subset of sentences (call them "discretionary sentences") in which judges were
free, as a legal and practical matter, to sentence below the guideline range. The
documents from the District of Massachusetts show that in a surprising number
of cases-almost 20% of the Boston sentences in the dataset-judges did not
have the option of imposing a below-range sentence. Sometimes a statutory
mandatory minimum makes it unlawful to sentence below the guideline minimum. Sometimes, by the time of sentencing, the defendant has already served a
term in custody within the guideline range. And sometimes the guideline sentencing range includes a sentence of probation, making a below-range sentence
effectively impossible.1 60
Those constraints suggest that the high rate of within-range sentencing that
has continued since Booker is partially misleading, the product of legal and
practical obstacles rather than continued fealty to the Guidelines. But they also
suggest that there exists a narrower class of discretionary sentences, of special
interest to researchers studying inter-judge disparity, in which judges had the
full range of guideline sentencing options available. Thus, in its review of
guideline sentencing outcomes, the study conducts a separate analysis of discretionary sentences.
4.

Why Massachusetts?

This study depends on data from the District of Massachusetts, and it is no
accident that this particular court makes its sentencing documents available to
the public. The judges of the District of Massachusetts take a special interest in
sentencing; indeed, several are well-respected as sentencing experts. Judges
Nancy Gertner,161 William Young,162 and Patti Saris1 63 have written scholarly

159. For an explanation of the cutoff dates for each period, see infra notes 232-37 and
accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 249-56 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, Circumventing Juries, Undermining Justice: Lessons
from Criminal Trials and Sentencing, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 419 (1999); Nancy Gertner,
From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. CRIM. L.J.
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articles on sentencing issues. Their public-access policy reflects a laudable
commitment to transparency and public debate on federal sentencing.
As with any study of a single district, however, the results may not be representative of sentencing nationwide. 164 The same qualities that led the court to
approve its disclosure policy might make it dissimilar from other courts. Massachusetts is also one of the nation's most politically liberal and Democratic
states,165 although at the time of the study the district's fifteen-member bench
was split roughly evenly, with eight Democrats and seven Republicans presently sitting.166 Also, average sentences in Massachusetts are slightly longer than
sentences nationwide, and the rate of below-guideline sentencing in Massachusetts is higher than the rate nationwide. 167 Those differences set the District of
523 (2007) [hereinafter Gertner, Omnipotence to Impotence]; Nancy Gertner, Rita Needs
Gall-How To Make the Sentencing Guidelines Advisory, 85 DEN. U. L. REv. 63 (2007);
Gertner, supra note 100; Gertner, supra note 104; Nancy Gertner, Women Offenders and the
Sentencing Guidelines, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 291 (2002); Nancy Gertner, FederalSentencing Guidelines: A View from the Bench, HUM. RTs., Spring 2002, at 6.
162. See, e.g., William G. Young, An Open Letter to U.S. District Judges, 50 FED.
LAw., July 2003, at 30. Judge Young's remarkable 177-page decision in United States v.
Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259 (D. Mass. 2004), not only anticipated the invalidation of the

Guidelines on Sixth Amendment grounds, but contains one of the most comprehensive critiques of the Guidelines ever assembled.
163. See Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar Screens: Have the Sentencing Guidelines
Eliminated Disparity?One Judge's Perspective,30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1027 (1997).
164. Hofer et al., supra note 47, at 279.
165. 2008 Presidential Race: Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2008,
http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/states/massachusetts (noting that over the last
ten Presidential elections, Massachusetts has been the most solidly Democratic state in the
country); Lydia Saad, Political Ideology: "Conservative" Label Prevails in the South,
(Aug.
14,
2009),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/122333/political-ideology
GALLUP
-conservative-label-prevails-south.aspx (using Gallup poll results to show that Massachusetts
is the most liberal state in the nation, trailing only the District of Columbia).
166. See BiographicalDirectory of FederalJudges, supra note 99. Party affiliation is
an imperfect proxy for ideology, and Republican judges in a politically liberal state like
Massachusetts probably skew more liberal than their Republican colleagues nationwide.
Nonetheless, a study of Boston judges does not involve any greater risk of party and ideology effects than past studies of San Francisco, see Waldfogel, Empirically Based Sentencing,
supra note 55, at 294, or New York City and Philadelphia, see Payne, supra note 55, at 337.
Even the large-scale national studies have ensured a random distribution of cases by limiting
their data set to district offices where multiple judges shared a single case wheel, which necessarily oversamples sentences in cities with disproportionately liberal and Democratic
populations.
167. The data supporting this comparison can be found in appendix B of the 2002-2008
editions of the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Sourcebook of FederalSentencing Statistics.
The gap between the national and Massachusetts figures for guideline sentencing is partially
attributable to "fast-track" programs for immigration offenses, see U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K3.1 (2009) (authorizing departures for early disposition programs), which account for 7.9% of sentences nationwide, according to the fiscal year 2008
data. Fast-track programs ease a crushing burden on courts and prosecutors in border districts, but they are controversial because they must be authorized by the Attorney General
and are not available in all districts, injecting obvious regional disparity into sentencing out-
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Massachusetts apart from other district courts, potentially undermining its representativeness.
On the other hand, there are a number of advantages-other than the
unique trove of data-to focusing on judges in a single district when studying
inter-judge sentencing disparity. First, it avoids the risk that inter-district disparity in prosecutorial practices might be mistaken for inter-judge disparity.1 68
In Massachusetts, the Criminal Division of a single U.S. Attorney's office
charges and prosecutes virtually all federal cases.'16 Second, it avoids the risk
that inter-region disparity in the types of offenses committed or prosecuted
might be mistaken for inter-judge disparity by comparing judges who share a
common case pool. This study focuses on a core group of judges who drew
cases at random from a common pool in Boston. Third, it avoids concerns
about inter-circuit disparity caused by differences in appellate courts. In the
wake of Booker, regional courts of appeals split on a number of questions concerning reasonableness review, 170 and Schanzenbach and Tiller have found that
the partisan alignment of circuit courts can affect sentence length and the likelihood of departure. 17 1 Examining a single district ensures that all judges being
studied were bound to follow the same circuit precedent, subject to review by
the same mix of appellate judges.
Of course, this study's findings about the sentencing patterns in Boston do
not necessarily explain sentencing patterns in far-flung cities nationwide. It offers a first look at inter-judge disparity after Booker, but by no means the final
word. Nonetheless, the Massachusetts documents offer researchers unparalleled
access to judge-specific sentencing data, and therefore the best available evicomes. Fast-track programs have the effect of boosting the nationwide rate of governmentsponsored sentences compared with districts, like Massachusetts, that have no fast-track authority.
168. See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities:An Empirical
Study of Charging and BargainingPractices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66
S. CAL. L. REv. 501, 552-58 (1992) (documenting inter-district disparities driven by prosecutor and defense practices); Daniel Richman, FederalSentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court
Holds-The Center Doesn't, 117 YALE L.J. 1374, 1403-06 (2008) (discussing inter-district
disparities driven by differences among federal prosecutors' offices).
169. See Divisions, U.S. ATT'Y'S OFF. DISTRICT MASS. (last visited Sept. 3, 2010),
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ma/divisons.html. It is possible that prosecutors and defense attorneys in the district change their charging and plea bargaining practices in response to the
judge assigned to the case, based on the judge's reputation. Because such changes reflect an
assessment of the judge, rather than differences between prosecutors or between defense attorneys, they are properly treated as sources of inter-judge disparity.
170. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007) (rejecting the conclusion of
some courts of appeals that a significant variance from the Guidelines requires an extraordinary justification); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) (affirming the decision of
some courts of appeals to apply a presumption of reasonableness when reviewing withinrange sentences on appeal).
171. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 93, at 735. For foundational research on
the influence of party affiliation on courts of appeals, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE
JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006).
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dence of how sentencing by individual judges has changed in the wake of
Booker, Gall, and Kimbrough.
B. Results

Analysis of the Boston data reveals a clear increase in inter-judge sentencing disparity, both in sentence length and in guideline sentencing patterns. The
effect of the judge on sentence length has doubled in strength since Kimbrough
and Gall. And in their guideline sentencing patterns, judges have responded in
starkly different ways to Booker, with some following a "free at last" pattern
and others a "business as usual" pattern.
1.

Sentence length

Among Boston judges as a whole, average sentence length has increased
since Booker. Figure 3 shows the increase, both for all sentences and for sentences not governed by a statutory mandatory minimum.1 72

172. Cases were treated as having no mandatory minimum if the court sentenced below
the otherwise-applicable minimum based on the statutory "safety valve," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)
(2006), or a government "substantial assistance" motion, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006);
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 5K1.1

(2009).
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FIGURE 3
Average Sentence Length, Boston Judges
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Average sentence length climbed from 47.7 months before Booker, to 58.3
months in the years following Booker, to 63.7 months after Kimbrough and
Gall. Excluding cases subject to a mandatory minimum, the increase is more
gradual, from 30.8 months before Booker, to 33.7 months after Booker, to 35.5
months after Kimbrough and Gall.

But average sentence length for the district as a whole masks significant
variation among individual judges. Figure 4a shows the distribution of average
sentence length for each judge as it has changed over time-before Booker, after Booker, and after Kimbrough and Gall. Each dot represents the average sentence for a single judge. Figure 4b shows the same distribution, but leaves high
and low values unshaded to make it easier to see how the remaining dots are
clustered:
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FIGURE 4B
Average Sentence
Distribution, Including
Mandatory Minimums
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Although the difference between the highest and lowest averages remains
essentially unchanged between periods, the distribution of averages has widened compared to the Pre-Booker period. After Kimbrough and Gall, in particular, two clusters of judges are readily apparent: one cluster following the
trend toward higher sentences with averages around 70 months, and another
cluster splitting off with averages around 45 months.
Statistical analysis confirms that the effect of the judge on sentence length
has grown stronger since Kimbrough and Gall. Table I reports the results:
TABLE 1
Summary of Linear Regression Models, Sentence Length

Pre-Booker
Post-Booker
Kimbrough/Gall

73

%Variance
Explained
3.1%

Avg. Variance
Explained
10.8 months

Model
Significance
.001*

2.5%
6.1%

10.9 months
15.5 months

.003*
.044*

Note: * Significant at the .05 level

173. For details of these regression models for sentence length, see Table A4.
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For each period, the "%Variance Explained" column reports the percentage of variance in sentence length explained by which judge was assigned to
the case. The "Avg. Variance Explained" column converts that percentage into
actual months of variance explained, as an average for all sentences. The
"Model Significance" column reports the statistical significance of the model.174
For the full set of sentences, the regression models indicate a delayed reaction, but ultimately a sharp uptick in inter-judge sentencing disparity since
Booker. In the years before the decision, the percentage of variance in sentence
length explained by the identity of the judge stood at 3.1%. Immediately after
Booker, the rate actually declined slightly to 2.5%. But in the Kimbrough/Gall
period, it rose sharply to 6.1%. That means the effect of the judge on sentence
length is now twice as strong as in the three years before Booker. 75
The increase in inter-judge disparity is even clearer in cases not governed
by a mandatory minimum sentence. As previous researchers have noted, mandatory minimums affect sentence length for all judges and, as a result, may
mask changes in inter-judge disparity. Figure 5 shows the pre-Booker and postBooker distribution of average sentences for cases not subject to a mandatory
minimum:

FIGURE 5
Average Sentence Distribution,
Excluding Mandatory Minimums
60

50

Z 40-

302-~*

-J

0
Pre-Boaker
2002-2004

Post-Aoker Kimbrough)Gal
2005-2007
2007-2008

174. For discussion of the regression models generally, see infra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
175. For a discussion of period-selection issues, see Appendix A.1.
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For cases not subject to a mandatory minimum, the trend is unmistakable.
The distribution of average sentences among judges has grown substantially
wider since Booker: from a total spread of 15 months before Booker, to almost
30 months after Booker, to almost 40 months in the wake of Kimbrough and
Gall.

The stark differences between judges have real consequences for criminal
defendants. Before Booker, regardless of the judge, a defendant in Boston not
facing a mandatory minimum could expect that the judge's average sentence
would fall between 25.6 months and 40.2 months. Today, after Kimbrough and
Gall, three judges on the court are imposing average sentences of 25.5 months
or less, while two other judges on the court are imposing average sentences of
51.4 months or more. That is an average difference of more than two years in
prison, depending on which judge is assigned to the case.
Again, statistical analysis confirms that, for sentences not subject to a
mandatory minimum, the relationship between the identity of the judge and the
length of the sentence has grown stronger since Booker. Table 2 reports the results:
TABLE 2
Summary of Linear Regression Models, Sentence Length
Excluding Mandatory Minimums1 76

Pre-Booker
Post-Booker
KimbroughlGall

%Variance
Explained
1.4%
3.1%

Avg. Variance
Explained
4.9 months
8.0 months

Model
Significance
.368
.021*

8.0%

10.3 months

.180

Note: * Significant at the .05 level

For sentences not governed by a mandatory minimum, in the Pre-Booker
period the rate of variance in sentence length explained by the identity of the
judge was very small, just 1.4%, and the relationship was not statistically significant. After Booker, however, the rate more than doubled to 3.1% and the
identity of the judge became a statistically significant predictor of sentence
length. For sentences since Kimbrough and Gall, the model is not statistically
significant, so it is not possible to exclude the possibility that the relationship
was the product of chance.17 7 The limited data for that period suggest, howev176. For details of these regression models, see Table A5.
177. The fact that the model for the Kimbrough/Gall period is not significant reinforces
the need for caution in interpreting the results for cases not governed by a mandatory minimum. Statistical significance is highly sensitive to sample size, and the Kimbrough/Gall period necessarily has about one-third as many cases as the other periods, even before excluding mandatory minimums. Although the relationship in the Kimbrough/Gall period is
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er, that the rate of variance explained has increased further to 8.0%-more than
five times pre-Booker levels.
2.

Guideline sentencingpatterns

Similarly, analysis of guideline sentencing patterns after Booker indicates
that, consistent with anecdotal reports from around the country, there has been
a spike in inter-judge disparity. Some Boston judges have embraced their newfound discretion to depart from the guideline range more enthusiastically than
others. Consider the below-range sentencing patterns of four judges, A, B, C,
and D.' 78
Sentences by Judge A closely track the pattern for the district as a whole.
Under the mandatory Guidelines, 19.6% of Judge A's sentences fell below the
guideline range. Under the PROTECT Act, that figure fell sharply to 7.7%. But
after Booker, it rebounded to well above pre-Booker levels at over 35%, and
has remained at those levels continuously for more than four years.
Sentences by Judge B fit a "free at last"1 79 pattern: a low rate of belowrange sentencing in the two pre-Booker periods (11.1% and 10.5%) followed
by a much higher rate in the three post-Booker periods (41.7%, 36.2%, and
52.8%). Judge B's rate of below-range sentencing has more than quadrupled. 80
Sentences by Judge C fit a "business as usual" pattern, with very little
change between periods. Judge C's rate of below-range sentencing moved less
than one-half of one percent after Booker, from 10.5% to 10.9%, and has remained stable throughout the other periods as well (13.3%, 18.8%, and
16.1%).l81

strongly positive, the model falls well short of statistical significance.
178. This Article uses letters, rather than names, to identify judges. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
179. See Gertner,supra note 104, at 137-38 (using the phrase "free at last" to describe
the reaction to Booker among some district court judges).
180. Sentences by Judges E, F, and G also fit this pattern. Judge E's rate of belowrange sentencing approximately tripled since Booker, from 7.3% in the Mandatory Guidelines period and 13.3% in the PROTECT Act period, to 34.0% and 32.7% in the two postBooker periods, and falling to 21.2% in the Kimbrough/Gallperiod. Judge F's rate of belowrange sentencing has more than doubled, from 15.0% in the Mandatory Guidelines period
and 14.7% in the PROTECT Act period, to 34.1% and 31.6% in the two post-Booker periods. So has Judge G's rate of below-range sentencing, which went from 13.9% in the Mandatory Guidelines period, to 10.5% in the PROTECT Act period, to 33.3%, 34.0%, and
32.4% in the three periods since Booker.
181. Sentences by Judge H fit a similar pattern. Judge H's below-range sentencing
rates in the pre-Booker periods (16.5% and 23.9%) are very similar to those in the postBooker periods (24.4%, 25.5%, and 17.4%). Sentences by Judge I seemed to fit this pattern
during the eighteen months after Booker with a rate of 22.0%, compared with 25.9% in the
Mandatory Guidelines period and 21.1% under the PROTECT Act. But Judge I's rate of below-range sentencing more than doubled to 47.7% in the Post-Booker II period, and stands at
38.9% in the KimbroughlGallperiod.
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Sentences by Judge D fit a "return to form" pattern. Judge D's rate of below-range sentencing stood at 32.7% in the Mandatory Guidelines period, but
plummeted to 5.6% under the PROTECT Act. Recently it has returned to
41.5% and 34.6% in the two most recent periods.182
Figures 6a-6d show the sentencing patterns of Judges A, B, C, and D, overlaid on the average sentencing pattern for the district as a whole:
FIGURE 6B
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182. The sentencing pattern of Judge J is unique and highly volatile. From a belowrange sentencing rate of 24.6% in the Mandatory Guidelines period, it dropped to 11.9% under the PROTECT Act, nearly tripled to 32.1% in the Post-Booker I period, dropped again to
19.1% in the Post-Booker II period, and has nearly doubled again to 31.8% in the Kimbrough/Gallperiod.
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FIGURE 6c

FIGURE 6D

Guideline Sentencing,
Judge C

Guideline Sentencing,
Judge D

-Average
-Judge C

so%-

40%

*5 40%-

/
en30%-

20%

20%-

/

a

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

~0'

N
N

Mandalory PROTCT Postodke Potooker Kmbrough
Gal
I
I
Act
Guidelines

/

Mandato PROTECT Post0ker Post oke, Kimbrough
GaD
a
I
Guideines
Act

These disparate patterns suggest that reports by the Commission fail to
capture important differences in the way that individual judges have responded
to Booker. Judge B imposed sentences below the guideline range in about 11%
of cases before Booker, but in the most recent period has imposed below-range
sentences in about 53% of cases. Judge C, by contrast, also sentenced below the
guideline range in approximately 10% of cases before Booker, but most recently has imposed below-range sentences in only 16% of cases. That is a stark difference in post-Booker sentencing behavior, and tends to corroborate anecdotal
reports of a surge in inter-judge sentencing disparity.
Statistical analysis of how far, on average, each judge has sentenced from
the guideline range confirms an increase in inter-judge disparity in guideline
sentencing. Figure 7a shows the distribution of average distance from the
guideline range, with each dot representing the average distance for one judge:
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FIGURE 7A

Distribution in Average Distance from Guideline Range,
All Sentences
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Under the mandatory Guidelines in 2002-2003, average distance from the
guideline range was tightly clustered within a range of 4.5 months. Perhaps
surprisingly, the spread increased under the PROTECT Act, covering 8.2
months. But after Booker, the distribution has widened dramatically and grown
broader in every period. In the most recent period, following Kimbrough and
Gall, average distances from the Guidelines span 20.0 months, ranging from
4.2 months to a remarkable 24.2 months.
As expected, the trend is even more pronounced for "discretionary" sentences in which the sentencing judge was free, as a legal and practical matter, to
sentence outside the guideline range.183 Figure 7b shows the distribution of average distance from the guideline range for the subset of discretionary sentences:

183. See infra Appendix A.4 (defining "discretionary" sentences and explaining why
they are of special relevance in measuring inter-judge disparity in guideline sentencing).
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FIGURE 7B

Distribution in Average Distance from Guideline Range,
Discretionary Sentences
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Under the mandatory Guidelines, average distance from the guideline
range was clustered within a range of 5.6 months. Under the PROTECT Act the
range increased to 12.4 months. Since then, the distribution has widened to 16.5
months, then 23.8 months, and most recently 23.4 months.
For criminal defendants in the 80% of cases where the judge has full discretion to sentence outside the guideline range, the difference between judges
has serious consequences. Under the mandatory Guidelines in 2002-2003, regardless of the judge assigned to the case, a criminal defendant could expect an
average sentence within 7.8 months or less of the Guidelines. Today, in the
wake of Kimbrough and Gall, three judges in Boston continue to sentence on
average 6.1 months or less from the guideline range. But a different group of
three Boston judges sentences, on average, 24.6 months or more outside of the
guideline range. That is an average difference of more than a year and a half in
prison, depending on the judge.
Statistical analysis reinforces that inter-judge disparity in distance from the
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guideline range has increased since Booker. 184 Table 3 reports the results of linear regression models calculating the percentage of variance explained by the
judge, both for all sentences and for discretionary sentences:
TABLE 3
Summary of Linear Regression Models
Distance from Guideline Rangel 85
%Variance

Exjlained

Avg. Variance

Explained

months
months
months
months

Model

Siificance
.847
.482
.089
.048*

Mandatory Guidelines
PROTECT Act
Post-Booker I
Post-Booker II

1.0%
2.4%
3.6%
3.7%

1.4
2.7
3.9
4.8

Kimbrough/Gall

6.6%

7.1 months

.073

Mandatory Guidelines
PROTECT Act
Post-Booker I
Post-Booker II
Kimbrough/Gall

1.3%
3.6%
4.5%
5.1%
9.4%

1.8
3.7
4.9
6.2
9.1

.853
.384
.105
.038*
.037*

months
months
months
months
months

Note: * Significant at the .05 level

The models confirm that, before Booker, the identity of the sentencing
judge bore a very small and nonsignificant relationship to the distance between
the sentence imposed and the guideline range. Since Booker, however, the identity of the judge has become a statistically significant predictor of how far a
sentence will fall from the Guidelines. And the relationship has grown steadily
stronger, explaining 3.6% of variance for all sentences during the first eighteen
months after Booker and 6.6% (more than double pre-Booker levels) since
Kimbrough and Gall. As expected, the trend is even stronger for discretionary
sentences, with the identity of the judge explaining 9.4% of the variance (nearly
triple pre-Booker levels) since Kimbrough and Gall.
Together, these measures of sentencing outcomes in Boston tend to corroborate anecdotal reports of a surge in inter-judge sentencing disparity. Since the
Supreme Court's decisions in Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall, the effect of the
judge on sentence length has more than doubled in strength. In cases not sub-

184. See Hofer et al., supra note 47, at 287. Actual months of variance explained were
determined by "(1) multiplying the total variance by the portion of the variance accounted
for by judges, and (2) finding the square root of the result, thus translating the numbers back
into absolute terms." Id. at 287 n.127.
185. For details of these regression models, see Tables A6 and A7.

HeinOnline -- 63 Stan. L. Rev. 40 2010-2011

December 2010]

SENTENCING AFTER BOOKER

41

ject to a mandatory minimum, the court's three most lenient judges are imposing average sentences of 25.5 months or less, while its two most severe judges
are imposing average sentences of 51.4 months or more, resulting in an average
difference of more than two years in prison depending on which judge is assigned the case. Similarly, the effect of the judge on how far sentences fall from
the guideline range has more than doubled. In Boston, some judges continue to
impose below-guideline sentences at essentially the same rate as before Booker,
as little as 16% of the time, while other judges now sentence below the guideline range at triple or quadruple their pre-Booker levels, as much as 53% of the
time.
III.

IMPLICATIONS

The results of the empirical study, showing a spike in inter-judge sentencing disparity after Booker, Gall, and Kimbrough, come as unwelcome news.
Although the study examines only one district court, its findings tend to reinforce anecdotal evidence from around the country warning of greater judge-tojudge disparity in sentencing outcomes. 186 If the same trends have played out in
other districts, they would mark a step backward from Congress's goal of reducing inter-judge sentencing disparity.
It is true that, despite the uptick in inter-judge disparity, the effect of the
judge remains relatively modest. Even after Kimbrough and Gall, the judge accounts for 6.1% of variation in sentence length (8.0% in cases not subject to a
mandatory minimum), and 6.6% of variation in distance from the guideline
range (9.4% for discretionary sentences). 187 Yet both the strength of the effect
and size of the change are larger than those reported in the Hofer study, 188 suggesting that Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall may have altered inter-judge disparity to a degree comparable to the original Guidelines. Moreover, as the Anderson-Kling-Stith study observed, the small fraction of variance explained by the
identity of the sentencing judge "tells us that there are many additional factors
that drive differences in sentences, but it does not lead us to conclude that interjudge disparity itself is small or unimportant."l 89 Although it is too early to
despair a return to "pre-guideline chaos," 1 90 the preliminary evidence-from
the only district court in which this sort of study is possible-is discouraging.
It also bears emphasis that inter-judge sentencing disparity is but one consideration among many in evaluating the federal sentencing system. It is entire186. See supra Part I.B.3.
187. See supra Tables 1 & 2 and accompanying text.
188. See Hofer et al., supra note 47, at 287; see also Waldfogel, Empirically Based
Sentencing, supra note 55, at 295.
189. Anderson et al., supra note 23, at 294 n.53.
190. That was what one Senator predicted in the immediate aftermath of Booker. Press
Release, Senator Chuck Grassley, Supreme Court Decision on Sentencing Guidelines (Jan.
13, 2005), availableat 2005 WLNR 2769009.
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ly possible to conclude that Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall have improved federal sentencing, on balance, by allowing judges greater flexibility to reject unjust guidelines and impose just sentences. And there are other urgent priorities
for federal sentencing reform, including reevaluating mandatory minimum sentences and confronting unwarranted disparity created by prosecutorial charging
and bargaining practices.19 1 Nonetheless, reducing inter-judge sentencing disparity was one of Congress's primary goals in the Sentencing Reform Act, and
evidence of backsliding ought to be taken seriously.
What explains the uptick in inter-judge sentencing disparity? Specifically,
why have "business as usual" judges continued to impose so many sentences
within the guideline range, even as their "free at last" colleagues have begun to
impose below-range sentences far more frequently? The Boston data tend to
undermine some of the conventional explanations that within-guideline sentencing is the product of inertia, risk aversion, anchoring, strategic behavior, or
laziness. Instead, I propose two possible explanations that have received surprisingly little attention. Some judges might actually agree with the Guidelines'
sentencing recommendations more often than their colleagues. And some
judges might choose to impose within-range sentences for institutional reasons,
such as deference to the Commission or a belief that the Guidelines carry democratic legitimacy.
A.

ConventionalExplanationsfor Within-Range Sentencing

As discussed above, the modest initial response to Booker has prompted
extensive speculation about why so many judges, freed from the shackles of the
mandatory guidelines regime, have continued to impose within-guideline sentences more than 80% of the time. The conventional wisdom points to five factors: (1) inertia among a generation of judges that has always treated the Guidelines as mandatory; (2) fear of reversal in the face of "reasonableness" review
by courts of appeals; (3) cognitive "anchoring" errors caused by using the
guideline range as a starting point; (4) strategic behavior by judges anxious to
avoid provoking Congress; and (5) simple laziness. 192 The Boston data, however, tend to undermine several of those explanations.
1. Inertia

The first, most common explanation of judges' unexpectedly mild reaction
to Booker was that most sitting judges have spent their entire careers imposing
sentences under the Guidelines' framework. It should come as no surprise, on

191. In addition to calling for research on inter-judge sentencing disparity, Attorney
General Holder has convened a department-wide Sentencing and Corrections Working
Group to consider those issues. See Holder,supra note 8.
192. See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
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this account, that a generation of judges that has "grown up" with the Guidelines would cling to them even though they have become advisory.193
The Boston data allow a partial test of that theory. If inertia were the primary reason why judges impose sentences in the guideline range, then we
might expect to see a difference in sentencing patterns between long-tenured
judges and their more junior colleagues. Judges appointed before 1987, who
tasted freedom under the pre-guidelines regime, might cast off the yoke of the
Guidelines more readily because they have personal experience imposing sentences in a fully discretionary system. Judges appointed after 1987, by contrast,
might experience greater inertia because they have never sentenced outside the
mandatory guidelines regime. It happens that, of the ten core judges in Boston
from 2002 to 2008, five joined the court before 1987, while the other five
joined the court after 1987 while the Guidelines were mandatory.
A comparison of sentencing outcomes, however, does not suggest a greater
"inertia effect" among more junior judges. As shown in Figures 8a and 8b the
difference between groups is negligible:
FIGURE 8A

FIGURE 8B
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From 2002 to 2008, there has been no meaningful difference in average

sentence length based on whether a judge was appointed before the effective

193. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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date of the Guidelines in 1987.194 Nor do patterns in guideline sentencing suggest a continuing inertia effect. It appears that pre-1987 judges responded more
quickly in the immediate aftermath of Booker, with a higher rate of belowrange sentencing than post-1987 .judges during the first eighteen months
(33.9% compared with 21.4%). But the difference quickly evaporated. For
more than 2.5 years, both groups have sentenced below the guideline range
around 30% of the time. 195
Of course, these similarities between judges appointed before 1987 and
their more junior colleagues do not rule out the possibility that inertia influenced the sentencing patterns of some judges. Eighteen years of mandatory
Guidelines may leave habits deeply ingrained in anyone. Still, with no direct
measure available, pre-1987 service is a credible proxy for judges' resistance to
legal change in this context, and it has no apparent explanatory power. The experience in Boston suggests that more than inertia is at work.
2. Risk aversion

A second conventional explanation for the generally modest effects of
Booker is that some district court judges were anxious to avoid reversal on appeal. It took several years for the Supreme Court and appellate courts to work
out the details of "reasonableness" review, and during that time district courts
faced considerable uncertainty at the appellate level.196 On the "risk aversion"
theory, some courageous judges immediately took advantage of their newfound
discretion to sentence outside the guideline range. But other judges, more riskaverse than their colleagues, have continued to cling to the guideline range to
avoid the embarrassment and hassle of reversal and resentencing.
Again, the Boston data allow a partial test of that explanation. If risk aversion were the primary reason why many judges continue to impose sentences in
the guideline range, then we might expect that decisions like Kimbrough and
Gall would produce more consistent guideline sentencing patterns among
members of the court. After all, Kimbrough and Gall reduced the risk of appellate reversal by announcing a highly deferential standard of review,1 97 and by
indicating that sentencing judges may categorically reject the Commission's
policy judgments.19 8 The Court thus made clear, even to the most risk-averse
judges, that they are free to sentence outside the guideline range with confidence. If post-Booker differences in guideline sentencing patterns were attributable to different levels of risk aversion, rather than other factors, then elimi194. Pre-1987 service by the sentencing judge was not a statistically significant predictor of sentence length in any of the three periods.
195. Pre-1987 service by the sentencing judge was not a statistically significant predictor of how far a sentence fell from the guideline range during any period.
196. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
197. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
198. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101-02 (2007).
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nating the source of risk should allow later guideline sentencing patterns to
come into closer alignment.
But in Boston, Kimbrough and Gall had the opposite effect: differences between judges' guideline sentencing patterns have grown even more acute. Differences between "free at last" and "business as usual" judges, for example, became more stark following Kimbrough and Gall. At the same time, the effect of
the judge on sentence length reached double pre-Booker levels, while the effect
of the judge on distance from the Guidelines strengthened to triple pre-Booker
levels.1 99 Far from allowing more timid judges to "catch up" to their more risktolerant colleagues, Kimbrough and Gall appear to have made inter-judge disparity worse.
No doubt risk aversion affected sentencing decisions in the years immediately after Booker.2 00 But the fact that inter-judge sentencing disparity appears to have persisted, even after Kimbrough and Gall greatly reduced the
threat of appellate reversal, suggests that risk aversion is an incomplete explanation.
3.

Anchoring

Another conventional explanation why some judges continue to sentence
within the Guidelines, grounded in behavioral psychology, is that the Guidelines cause a form of cognitive error known as "anchoring."201 Crucially, the
anchoring theory does not propose that judges intentionally rely on the Guidelines as a legitimate and persuasive source of sentencing advice. Rather, the
theory is that judges irrationallyassign too much weight to the guideline range,
just because it offers some initial numbers. Research has shown that giving a
sentencing official an initial value, even one that is known to be arbitrary, can
influence the length of a sentence. 20 2
The Boston data do not shed any light on the possibility that anchoring
might account for some inter-judge sentencing disparity. Comparisons are impossible because judges do not readily disclose, and may not be aware of, their
cognitive biases.
Still, the anchoring explanation seems strained because the Guidelines are
supposed to serve as an anchor. The Supreme Court in Gall admonished sentencing courts that "the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial
benchmark" for every criminal sentence. 203 Not only is it rational for judges to

199. See supra Tables 1 & 3 and accompanying text.
200. See Gertner, supra note 104, at 140 (concluding, in the period between Booker
and the decisions in Kimbrough and Gall, that appellate courts were closely policing sentences on appeal and that "[d]istrict judges have gotten the message").
201. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
202. Englich et al., supra note 106, at 194.

203. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
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give consideration to the guideline range, but it is legally compelled. And as
discussed below, rational people can disagree about how much weight to give
the Guidelines, relative to other considerations.
Moreover, to the extent the guideline range operates as an irrational "anchor" just because it supplies some initial numbers, its effects likely are offset by
other anchors tugging in different directions. In every criminal case, competing
"starting point" numbers may be offered by defense counsel, prosecutors, the
probation office, victim impact testimony, and the statutory sentencing range.
Judges also may recall the numbers they selected in other cases, perhaps hundreds of cases in a long career. As a result, judges do not approach sentencing
thinking about a single set of "anchor" numbers-the guideline minimum and
maximum-but with multiple numbers from various sources.
4.

Strategic behavior

Strategic behavior by judges is another conventional explanation for persistent within-range sentencing patterns in the wake of Booker.204 On this account, although judges were delighted by Booker and eager to impose belowrange sentences, they have taken a "go slow" approach to avoid provoking a
response from Congress. In theory that explanation is entirely plausible, although necessarily speculative. A rich empirical literature has documented other forms of strategic behavior by judges, 20 5 and nothing in this study forecloses
similar behavior in the sentencing context.
Yet in these circumstances, widespread strategic behavior seems unlikely
because of challenges in coordinating a "go slow" strategy. The sheer number
of district court judges and sentencing decisions makes this sort of strategy difficult to sustain. Individual district court judges must realize that nothing can
prevent their more than 600 colleagues nationwide from sentencing in a manner
that agitates Congress. Thus, faced with particular cases in which the guideline
range seems unduly harsh, the strategic benefits of a within-range sentence
would appear tiny compared with the human costs of an unjust sentence. Given
the extent of persistent within-range sentencing since Booker, strategic behavior seems like a weak explanation.
5.

Laziness

Judicial laziness, the final conventional explanation, is particularly unpersuasive. A few judges, themselves critics of the Guidelines, have floated the

204. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9-18 (1998);
THOMAS H. HAMMOND ET AL., STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND POLICY CHOICE ON THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT 65-248 (2005); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 97-109 (2002).
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rather self-congratulatory theory that their colleagues cling to the guideline
range because they prefer "less work and less stress" and are unwilling to approach the task of sentencing with sufficient intellectual rigor.206 Although
judges-like the rest of us-undoubtedly consider their personal time constraints in approaching their work,20 7 the upheaval of Booker, Kimbrough, and
Gall forced judges to approach sentencing decisions with renewed caution and
seriousness. It is difficult to imagine that a vast segment of the federal bench,
despite being duty-bound to impose sentences consistent with § 3553(a), is mechanically following the Guidelines just to avoid thinking too much.
B. Alternative Explanationsfor Within-Range Sentencing

As alternatives to the conventional accounts, I propose two other explanations for the persistent high rate of sentences within the guideline range. One is
that some judges consistently agree, on the merits, with the Guidelines' recommendations about the appropriate level of punishment. Another is that some
judges, more than their colleagues, defer to the Guidelines for institutional reasons. Surprisingly, both of these possibilities have been largely ignored by the
legal literature.
1. Agreement with the Guidelines' recommendations

The most promising explanation for many judges' continued fidelity to the
Guidelines is also the simplest. Some judges might actually agree with the sentences recommended by the Guidelines more frequently than their colleagues.
Although now free to exercise independent judgment, some judges consistently
arrive at sentencing outcomes that match the Commission's recommendations.
The fact that some judges have followed a "business as usual" pattern of guideline sentencing, 20 8 even as the degree of freedom they enjoy at sentencing has
dramatically expanded, suggests that they simply do not wish to alter their preBooker sentencing practices. That fundamental difference of opinion between
"business as usual" and "free at last" judges tends to produce inter-judge sentencing disparity.
Remarkably, however, the scholarly literature has essentially ignored that
possibility. The enormous body of pre-Booker literature criticizing the Federal
Guidelines frequently created the impression of uniform opposition among
judges. 20 9 News reports described hostility so pervasive that "[m]any judges
206. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
207. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. EcoN. REv. 1, 31 (1993) (describing a "judicial utility
function" that includes work time and leisure time).
208. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
209. See Gertner, Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 161, at 530, 539 (describing
"robust judicial opposition to the Guidelines"); Gertner, supra note 100, at 267 (describing
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regard as a traitor any colleague who serves on the U.S. Sentencing Commission." 2 10 A few judges even resigned from the bench or refused to hear drug
cases in protest of the guidelines regime.211 Scholars cheerfully generalized
that "everybody loves to hate the Federal Sentencing Guidelines."212 Even
members of Congress took notice that judges seemed to "hate the sentencing
guidelines." 2 13
Surveys of federal judges, however, have documented a persistent split in
opinion. The most recent, a 2010 survey by the Sentencing Commission, asked
district court judges whether the guideline sentencing range was "generally appropriate," "too low," or "too high" for various categories of offenses. 2 14 Table
4a excerpts some of the results:
TABLE 4A
Results of 2010 Survey of District Court Judges 2 15

Too High

Offense
Drug Trafficking-Methamphetamine
Fraud
Firearms
Illegal Reentry into the U.S.
Drug Trafficking-Crack Cocaine
Child Pornography-Possession

34%
10%
23%
34%
70%
70%

Generlly
Appropriate
60%
65%
70%
55%
28%
26%

Too Low
6%
24%
7%
11%
2%
3%

how district court judges "overwhelmingly opposed the Guidelines"); Joseph W. Luby, Reining in the "JuniorVarsity Congress": A Callfor Meaningful JudicialReview of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1199, 1276 (1999) ("[Tjhe Commission has little
legitimacy in the sentencing regime. Its Guidelines are reviled (even though tolerated) by
lawyers, judges, and commentators alike."); Jos6 A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A
Dismal Failure,N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 1992, at 2 (claiming that "virtually everyone who is associated with the federal justice system" deems the Guidelines a "dismal failure").
210. Naftali Bendavid, Judicial Traitor or Consensus Builder? Breyer's Role as Sentencing PioneerStill Rankles, LEGAL TIMEs, May 16, 1994, at 7.
211. CriticizingSentencing Rules, U.S. Judge Resigns, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 30, 1990, § 1,
at 22; Don J. DeBenedictis, The Verdict Is In, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 78.
212. Klein & Steiker, supra note 32, at 232-33; see also Stephanos Bibas, Blakely's
FederalAftermath, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 333, 342 (2004) ("To put it bluntly, many judges
and others hate the Guidelines . . . ."); Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines' Modified Real-Offense System, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1342, 1343-44 (1997)
("[J]udging from the scholarly commentary, virtually everyone loves to hate [the Guide-

lines].").
213. Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Sentencing Guidelines: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 3-4 (2004) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (stating "I can understand why").
214. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGES JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 tbl.8 (2010).
215. See id.
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For most drug trafficking offenses, as well as for firearms, fraud, and immigration offenses, a majority of judges agrees with the Commission that the
guideline sentencing range is generally appropriate. 2 16 Even for the offenses
that generate the most forceful criticism of the Commission, such as trafficking
in crack cocaine and possession of child pornography, a substantial minoritymore than 25% of judges-believes that the guideline range is generally appropriate. The survey also revealed that a substantial minority of judges agrees
with the Commission that many offender characteristics are not "ordinarily relevant" in deciding whether to depart from the guideline range. 2 17
Those disagreements among judges are not new. A 2003 survey by the
Sentencing Commission asked district court judges to rate various aspects of
the Guidelines on a scale from 1 to 6, with 1 being the worst possible rating and
6 being the best.218 Table 4b excerpts some of the results:
TABLE 4B

Results of 2003 Survey of District Court Judges 2 19
I or2

3 or4

5 or 6

20.2%

42.8%

37.0%

45.0%

30.6%

24.4%

Asked how well the Guidelines achieve the purposes of sentencing in

§ 3553(a), 38.4% of district court judges gave them a 5 or 6, compared with
22.9% who gave them a 1 or 2.220 For five of the nine specific purposes of punishment in § 3553(a), a majority of judges rated the Guidelines a 5 or 6.221

216. Id. For all drug types except crack cocaine, more than 50% of judges responded
that the guideline range was generally appropriate. See id.
217. See id. at tbls.8 & 13. For example, although 41% of judges consider vocational
skills "ordinarily relevant," 53% consider that factor "not ordinarily relevant," and 6% con-

sider it "never relevant." Id.
218. See LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT SURVEY
OF ARTICLE Ill JUDGES ON THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, at ES-1 (2003), available
at http://www.ussc.gov/Judge_Survey/execsum.pdf.

219. Id. at 12 exh. 11-11, 15 exh. 11-14, 24 exh. 11-23, available at http://www.ussc.gov/
Judge Survey/jschap2.pdf.

220. Id. at 24 exh. 11-23.
221. Id. at 2 exh. 11-1, 3 exh. 11-3.
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And for the remaining purposes of punishment, a substantial minority of judges
gave the Guidelines a high rating. Asked how often the Guidelines prescribe a
222
Asked whether the Guidelines
just punishment, 37.0% gave them a 5 or 6.
offer sufficient flexibility at sentencing, 24.4% of district court judges gave
them a 5 or 6. 223 Although those judges were in the minority, they still formed
a large and stable portion of the federal bench.
The survey results thus suggest a simple explanation for increasing interjudge disparity after Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall. For at least a decade, even
before the shake-up of federal sentencing, a substantial contingent of federal
judges has quietly agreed with the Commission that the Guidelines generally
recommend appropriate sentences. Now that judges must directly apply the
purposes of punishment in § 3553(a), those inter-judge disagreements have direct consequences for criminal defendants. Judges who generally believe the
Guidelines perform poorly are free to routinely reject them, while judges who
generally believe the Guidelines perform well remain free to routinely follow
them. The result is a spike in judge-to-judge sentencing disparity.
2.

Institutionalconsiderations

Another possible explanation for the persistence of within-range sentencing
is that some judges, more than their colleagues, find institutional reasons for
deference to the Commission persuasive. In particular, they may be persuaded
by arguments about the competence of the Commission relative to individual
judges, or about the democratic legitimacy of the Guidelines.
First, concerns about institutional competence may persuade some judges
to stick close to the Guidelines. The Commission is designed to serve as an expert body, with trained staff, a dedicated research arm, and exhaustive data
concerning federal sentencing practices. 224 Judges may choose to accord strong
respect to the Commission's recommendations based on doubts about their own
competence, as individual judges, to make systemic judgments about sentencing policy. 22 5 They may be reluctant, for example, to "individualize" sentences
based on their own predictions about the future dangerousness of defendants. 226
222. Id. at 12 exh. 11-11.
223. Id. at 15 exh. 11-14.
224. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 349-50 (2007); United States v. Wilson,
350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 914-15 (D. Utah 2005) (Cassell, J.). For a thoughtful defense of the
Commission's work in the controversial context of the child pornography guidelines, see
United States v. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 862-64 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
225. United States v. Wanning, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1062 n.9 (D. Neb. 2005); see also Stephanos Bibas et al., PolicingPolitics at Sentencing, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 1371, 1388
(2009) (stating that "courts lack the institutional competence to make systemic policy choices," but "Congress has established an agency, the Sentencing Commission, to collect data
and the views of various constituencies in formulating policies and rules").
226. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45
STAN. L. REV. 523, 553-55 (1993) (acknowledging a division of opinion among scholars, but
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As one judge put it in a post-Booker opinion, "unlike Congress or the Commission, we judges lack the institutional capacity (and frankly, the personal competence) to set up and then enforce one new, well-chosen, theoretically coherent,
national standard."2 27
Second, concerns about institutional legitimacy may lead some judges to
accord strong respect to the Guidelines. Congress reserves to itself the power to
review, modify, and reject changes to the Guidelines. 228 Judges may conclude,
based on Congress's stamp of approval, that the Guidelines carry democratic
legitimacy, making it generally inappropriate for judges to substitute their own
policy and punishment values for those embodied in the Guidelines. 2 29
No doubt institutional considerations like these interact with other judgments at sentencing. In a case where the advisory guideline sentence strikes the
judge as grossly unjust, institutional respect for the Guidelines likely makes little difference. But in a case where the advisory guideline range seems just a little too high, and not grossly excessive, the judge's assessment of the institutional strengths of the Commission and the democratic legitimacy of the
Guidelines may make the difference between a within-range or below-range
sentence.
To be sure, critics of the Guidelines have vigorously challenged these institutional claims about competence and legitimacy. Scholars have noted, for example, that the Commission does not behave like most expert administrative
agencies-it frequently fails to marshal evidence or even provide a reasoned
explanation in support of its judgments. 230 They have also raised serious questions about whether the unique structure and composition of the Commission
actually undermine, rather than advance, its legitimacy.231 Many commentators
reviewing research showing that "despite our faith that we can spot those offenders most
likely to recidivate, individualized predictions of future dangerousness are little better than a
game of chance"); see also Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge
of Chaos: PredictingViolent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845,
1845-47 (2003); Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention,
76 B.U. L. REv. 113, 126 & n.39 (1996); Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARv. L. REv. 1429,
1450 (2001).
227. United States v. Tabor, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1061 (D. Neb. 2005).
228. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2006).
229. United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 593 (10th Cir. 2006) (describing the Guidelines as "an expression of popular political will about sentencing"); Wanning, 354 F. Supp.
2d at 1062 n.9; Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 915; Bibas et al., supra note 225, at 1388 ("Most
importantly, Congress has democratic legitimacy; courts do not.").
230. Luby, supra note 209, at 1202 ("The Commission ... rarely justifies its guidelines, consistently avoids on-the-record decisionmaking, and operates unencumbered by the
procedural safeguards that ensure the political legitimacy of other administrative agencies.");
Kate Stith & Jos6 A. Cabranes, Judging Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1247, 1270-71 (1997) (noting that "the Sentencing Commission almost never explains the reason behind a particular Guidelines rule," and characterizing the Guidelines as a
"compilation of administrative diktats").
231. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political
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have urged that the Commission's work, in general and in a host of specific instances, should not be entitled to deference. But not all judges will find those
arguments persuasive. The point is not that the institutional reasons for deferring to the Commission are correct, but that they supply a basis for the kind of
good-faith disagreement that can fuel inter-judge sentencing disparity.
We cannot know for certain why many judges, contrary to expectations,
have continued to impose within-guideline sentences at a high rate. The Boston
data do not foreclose the possibility that the conventional explanations-habit,
anxiety, cognitive error, strategic behavior, and laziness-might play some
role. But it is important to remember Occam's razor. Simpler explanations
should not be neglected. Some judges might actually agree with the Guidelines'
recommendations, or find institutional reasons for deference to the Guidelines
compelling.
CONCLUSION

Consistent with anecdotal reports from around the country, the first empirical study of individual judges' responses to Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall reports a spike in inter-judge sentencing disparity. Among judges in Boston, the
effect of the judge on sentence length has doubled in strength. So has the effect
of the judge on how far sentences fall from the guideline range. A clear split
has emerged between "free at last" judges, whose rate of below-range sentencing has tripled or quadrupled to as high as 53%, and "business as usual" judges,
whose rate of below-range sentencing has hardly changed since Booker and
remains as low as 16%. The consequences for criminal defendants are significant. In cases not governed by a mandatory minimum, drawing one of the
court's more severe judges, rather than its more lenient judges, means an average difference of more than two years in prison.
These findings are necessarily tentative. They reveal how judges in Boston
have responded to Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall, but they may not be representative of sentencing trends nationwide. And, of course, inter-judge disparity
is just one factor to consider in reforming the federal sentencing system. It is
entirely possible to conclude that, despite the spike in inter-judge disparity,
Booker on balance represents a step in the right direction.
But the advantages of Booker were immediately obvious. Greater flexibility has allowed sentencing judges to reject sentences they see as excessive and
to do justice for individual offenders much more frequently. The systemic consequences for inter-judge uniformity, by contrast, have been more difficult to
assess and slower to develop. This Article thus offers a critical first look at how
Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall have affected one of Congress's top sentencing
reform priorities.

Science ofFederalSentencing Reform, 58

STAN.

L. REv. 235, 254-55 (2005).
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APPENDIX

This Appendix provides additional details concerning the methodology and
results of the empirical study.
A. Methodological Details
1. Periodselection

The study examines sentences between fiscal years 2002 and 2008, the last
year for which data are available. In evaluating inter-judge disparity in sentence
length, the study divides that period into three time periods. The Pre-Booker
period begins on October 1, 2001, the first day of fiscal year 2002, and ends on
the date of the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington.232 Because
of the chaos that followed that decision, the interregnum between Blakely and
Booker is ignored. 233 The Post-Booker period extends almost three years, from
the date of the Booker decision until December 9, 2007. The Kimbrough/Gall
period begins on December 10, 2007, the date of those decisions, and ends on
September 30, 2008, the last day of the fiscal year. 234
In evaluating inter-judge disparity in guideline sentencing, the study subdi-

vides the pre-Booker and post-Booker periods to create five periods. The PreBooker period is divided into a Mandatory Guidelines period and a PROTECT
Act period, with the PROTECT Act period beginning on May 1, 2004, the effective date of the Act. The Post-Booker period is divided into two periods,
"Post-Booker I" and "Post-Booker II," with the latter period beginning on July
1,2006.
These cutoff dates were selected with two competing objectives in mind: to
create periods large enough to ensure a sufficient number of cases per judge,
but small enough to capture relevant changes in sentencing law. Because sentence length only indirectly reflects guideline sentencing patterns, longer periods allow for a larger number of sentences without ignoring potentially relevant legal changes.235 For guideline sentencing, however, the PROTECT Act
marks a critical change because it was explicitly designed to reduce the number

232. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
233. The Commission's post-Booker reports have largely ignored the period between
Blakely and Booker as well. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 92.
234. At its Data and Research Conference in May 2009, the Commission distributed
flash drives containing the full set of sentencing data files through fiscal year 2008. The release of fiscal years 2007 and 2008 data ahead of the ordinary schedule was unexpected, and
a valuable benefit for participants.
235. The Kimbrough/Gallperiod is shorter than the other periods because no data are
available for fiscal year 2009.
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of downward departures. 236 The study therefore divides the Pre-Booker period
to separate the effects of the PROTECT Act, and divides the Post-Booker period to create periods of roughly equal length. For the sake of completeness, the
Appendix also discusses how alternative time periods would affect the regression models. 237
2.

Case matching

To obtain judge-specific sentencing data, Max Schanzenbach and Emerson
Tiller have developed a work-around that uses docket information available on
PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) to match cases in the
Commission's database. As part of a study of the influence of judges' party affiliation on sentencing decisions, Schanzenbach and Tiller ran nationwide
searches for cases filed on twenty random dates during three judicial terms
from 1999 to 2002.238 They used docket information for those cases to match
records in PACER with records released by the Commission. In comparing
cases, they relied principally on the date and length of the sentence, but also
(when necessary) on the amount of any fine, the offense type, and the Hispanic
ethnicity of the defendant.2 39 They successfully matched about 80% of sentences returned in their searches. 240
Using Schanzenbach and Tiller's matching technique as a starting point, I
matched case dockets on PACER with electronic case records released by the
Commission. The search extended to every criminal case filed in the Boston
office between January 1, 2000, and June 30, 2008.241 The initial search
yielded around 5000 cases, which included dismissals, jurisdictional transfers,
or acquittals that did not result in a sentence. For cases in which a sentence was
imposed, I first attempted to find a match in the Commission's database using
information in the docket sheet. When the docket provided insufficient information-a common occurrence for fiscal years 2004 and later 242-information
236. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
237. See infra Tables A4 & A5 and accompanying text.
238. Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 93, at 729-30.
239. Id. at 729. Each of those data points ordinarily appears in the criminal docket,
with the exception of ethnicity. Schanzenbach and Tiller presumably determined ethnicity by
asking whether the defendant had a Hispanic-sounding name.
240. See id. at 730.
241. PACER's "Reports" tool allows searches by "Case Type," including criminal cases. I included pending and terminated defendants, but excluded cases involving fugitive defendants. I also conducted targeted searches for cases with earlier filing dates that were
"closed" during fiscal year 2002, to ensure a comparable percentage of matched cases in
each year being studied.
242. The Commission made date matching much more difficult because, beginning in
2004, case records no longer include the exact date of sentencing, but only the month and
year. U.S.

SENTENCING COMM'N, VARIABLE CODEBOOK FOR INDIVIDUAL OFFENDERs 63

(2009) (noting that after fiscal year 2003, "[t]he date on which the defendant was sentenced"
is not available).
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from the Statement of Reasons was used to narrow the list of potential matches.
This method proved highly reliable: less than 0.4% of sentences could not be
24 3
matched because of multiple similar sentences in the Commission's data.
The process resulted in 2659 matched cases, more than 90% of the Boston
sentences in the Commission's files. Table Al lists the number and percentage
of cases in the Commission's data that were successfully matched, by fiscal
year:
TABLE Al

Matched Cases, by Fiscal Year 244
All Boston Cases
Matched Cases
% of Cases Matched

2002
497
445
89.5%

2003
479
433
90.4%

2004
315
292
92.7%

2005
306
273
89.2%

2006
418
387
92.6%

2007
460
430
93.5%

2008
403
369
91.6%

Total
2878
2629
91.3%

Table A2 lists the final number of sentences for each core judge, by period:
TABLE A2
Sentence Count for Judges

Judge A
Judge B
Judge C
Judge D
Judge E
Judge F
Judge G
Judge H
Judge I
Judge J
Total

Mandatory
Guidelines
56
54
60
52
82
40
65
79
54
61
603

PROTECT
Act
39
38
38
36
45
34
38
46
38
42
394

PostBooker
68
36
64
50
55
44
30
45
41
56
489

PostBooker !
48
47
64
41
49
57
53
47
44
68
518

Kimbrough/
Gall
17
36
31
26
33
34
23
36
22
258

Total
228
211
257
205
264
175
220
240
213
249
2262

243. Cf Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 93, at 730 (reporting that only 3% of sen-

tences could not be matched using the docket sheet alone, mostly in immigration cases). Like
Schanzenbach and Tiller, however, I encountered a surprising number of sentences, about
8.5% of those in the initial search, that did not look similar to any of the Commission's
records. I echo their concern that this is a significant amount of missing data. See id.
244. Fiscal years 2004 and 2005 include fewer sentences because they exclude sentences imposed between Blakely and Booker. Boston cases were identified using the Com-

mission's parole office code, except that cases without any parole office code were included.
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Random distribution

Following the Hofer and Waldfogel studies, chi-square analyses were conducted to test the randomness of sentence assignment, using several case
attributes that cannot easily be changed after filing: the defendant's race, gender, age, and education. 245 All four tests supported the conclusion that the distribution was random for the dataset as a whole. The gender, age, and education
tests further supported the conclusion that the distribution was random in each
period. 2 46
Chi-square analysis based on the defendant's race supported the conclusion
that the distribution was random in the Mandatory Guidelines, PROTECT Act,
and Kimbrough/Gall periods. But for the two post-Booker periods, the race of
the defendant was not demonstrably independent of the identity of the sentencing judge. The likely culprit is drug conspiracy cases, which frequently involve
multiple defendants of the same race. The Hofer study encountered similar difficulties with using chi-square tests based on race for large cities, 247 and in
light of the results for other attributes, the results for race do not undermine the
premise that sentences were distributed randomly. 248
Another important assumption of this natural experiment is that changes in
sentencing outcomes from 2002 to 2008 are exogenous, caused by Booker and
related developments in sentencing law rather than on-the-ground factors in
Boston. As Table A3 shows, however, the composition of the case pool for
Boston judges has not meaningfully changed from period to period:
TABLE A3
Percent of Cases for Each Offense Type, by Period
Drug Trafficking
41.2%
38.4%
42.2%

Fraud
13.9%
12.6%
11.0%

Post-Booker II

37.6%

Kimbrough/Gall
All Periods

43.5%
40.4%

Mandatory Guidelines
PROTECT Act
Post-Booker1

Immigration
10.8%
13.0%
12.0%

Firearms
7.3%
11.1%
9.1%

15.3%

9.5%

11.1%

14.4%
13.5%

11.2%
11.2%

13.7%
9.9%

245. Because chi-square analysis depends on a minimum number of cases per cell, the
race variable (the Commission's NEWRACE) was limited to white, black, and Hispanic offenders, omitting the "other" category. Similarly, the education variable (NEWEDUC) omitted the "college graduate" category, which applied to too few defendants. The Commission's
age variable was coded into three categories: age 18-29, age 30-39, and age 40 and over.
246. Chi-square tests on age uncovered no significant relationship in any period. Tests
on education uncovered no significant relationship in any period except Kimbrough/Gall,
and that result likely was affected by the smaller population of cases. Tests on gender uncovered no significant relationship in any period except Post-Booker 11. Given the results for
gender in adjacent periods and for the dataset as a whole, that result does not call into question the premise that the distribution of cases was random.
247. Hofer et al., supra note 47, technical app. at 320.
248. Cf Waldfogel, Empirically Based Sentencing, supra note 55, at 295 (relying ex-

clusively on a test of randomness using gender).
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Together, the four largest primary offense types in Boston-drug trafficking, fraud, immigration, and firearms-account for about 75% of the case pool.
The percentage of cases of each type shifts slightly from period to period, but
there are no trends in composition of the case pool that would appear to account
for changes in inter-judge sentencing disparity.
4.

Discretionarysentences

In evaluating guideline sentencing patterns, this study draws a distinction
between "discretionary" sentences and sentences in which the judge, for legal
or practical reasons, lacked the ability to sentence below the guideline range.
Several recurring constraints became apparent in the course of coding thousands of case records from the District of Massachusetts.
First, a statutory mandatory minimum sometimes prevents judges from imposing a below-range sentence. By operation of the Guidelines, whenever a
mandatory minimum exceeds the guideline minimum, then the bottom end of
the guideline range effectively shifts upward. 24 9 For example, if the sentencing
range under the Guidelines is 51-63 months, but the statutory minimum is 60
months, then the sentencing range becomes 60-63 months. 250 A judge who imposes a 60-month sentence under those circumstances has imposed a withinrange sentence, but had no option to impose a below-range sentence. In the
Boston dataset, a statutory mandatory minimum made it impossible for the
judge to impose a below-range sentence in 6.3% of cases. 25 1
Second, the time a defendant already has spent in custody sometimes prevents judges from imposing a below-range sentence. In the federal system, defendants may receive credit for time served in official detention prior to the
date the sentence commences. 252 It is common, in such cases, for a judge to
impose a sentence of "time served," allowing the defendant to be released immediately. If the time served by the defendant at the time of sentencing exceeds
the guideline minimum, the judge cannot impose a sentence below the guide253
line range because the defendant already has served a within-range sentence.
249. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1(c)(2) (2009). If the statutory
minimum exceeds both the guideline minimum and the guideline maximum, then the statutory minimum becomes the guideline sentence. Id. § 5G 1.1(b).
250. See id. § 5G1.1 cmt.
251. Missing data prevented the coding of constraints for 1.2% of cases in the dataset.
Percentages reported for each constraint are based on the remaining cases.
252. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2006).
253. Although not a legal constraint, the federal judges with whom I have spoken cannot imagine circumstances in which a judge would impose a sentence of less than time
served, which would imply that the prior detention was unlawful. See Telephone Interview
with Paul Cassell, Professor and Former District Court Judge for the District of Utah (Oct.
10, 2008); cf U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IB1.10 cmt. n.3 (2009) (prohibiting
the reduction of a sentence "below time served" following a downward amendment to the
Guidelines).
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In this dataset, a term of time served prevented a below-range sentence in 4.1%
of cases. 254
Third, notwithstanding their reputation for severity, the Guidelines often
recommend a sentence of probation as an appropriate punishment. For sentences with a guideline range of 0-6 months, a sentence of probation is a within-range sentence. 255 For sentences with a guideline range of 6-12 months, a
sentence of probation qualifies as a within-range sentence if it includes some
conditions of intermittent, community, or home confinement. 256 Judges who
take advantage of these options can impose a term of probation without sentencing below the guideline range. In this dataset, the Guidelines recommended
a sentence of probation in 9.0% of cases.
Together, these constraints were present in 19.4% of cases and accounted
for almost one-third of within-guideline sentences. Yet the existing literature on
federal sentencing has almost entirely ignored the role that they play in limiting
the discretion of district courts.257 Many within-range sentences can be traced
to statutory and practical constraints that limit the sentencing judge's options.
B. DetailedResults
1. Regression models

The study reports the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
models, using a separate linear model for each period. Dummy indicators for
each judge served as independent variables. 258 R-squared was used to measure
the percentage of variance in the dependent variable explained by the identity
of the sentencing judge. 259 As in the Hofer study, the percentage of variance
explained by the model is then converted into actual months, as an average
260
across all sentences for all judges.

254. To the extent that the "time served" constraint overlapped with other constraints,
the case was coded as "time served."
255. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5B1.1(a)(1) (2009).
256. Id. § 5Bl.1(a)(2).
257. See Hofer et al., supra note 47, at 275 & nn.101-03 (recognizing the distorting effect of mandatory minimums).
258. See Waldfogel, EmpiricallyBased Sentencing, supra note 55, at 295.
259. In linear regression, the R-squared statistic is a value between 0 and 1 that describes the percentage of variance in the dependent variable that is explained by the independent variable. See generally MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR
LAWYERS 345 (1990). For a discussion of some uses and limitations of R-squared, see David
R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, An Empirical Analysis of Life Tenure: A Response to Professors
Calabresi & Lindgren, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 791, 817 (2007). The R-squared values
here are shown as percentages.
260. Hofer et al., supra note 47, at 287. Actual months of variance explained were determined by "(1) multiplying the total variance by the portion of the variance accounted for
by judges, and (2) finding the square root of the result, thus translating the numbers back into
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The two independent variables examined in the sets of regression models
are sentence length and distance from the guideline range. Sentence length is
measured in months of imprisonment, with a sentence of probation treated as
zero months. Distance from the guideline range measures how far each sentence falls from the guideline range. Specifically, for above-range sentences,
the distance was calculated as the difference between the sentence imposed and
the guideline maximum. For below-range sentences, the distance was calculated
as the difference between the sentence imposed and the guideline minimum. For
within-range sentences, the distance was coded as zero. 26 1
Neither sentence length nor distance from the guideline range is perfectly
normally distributed, an assumption of OLS regression. By definition neither
can have a negative value, and both have a large number of cases with a value
of zero, resulting in a "censored" distribution. The Hofer study concluded that,
notwithstanding those features, the distribution of sentence length is sufficiently normal to permit reliable regression models. 262 To account for the potential
effects of the cutoff at zero, however, each model was reanalyzed using the Tobit estimation technique, which is designed for partially censored distributions. 263 The results were materially identical, for both dependent variables and
for all periods, in calculating statistical significance and in approximating
changes in goodness of fit.
The following pages provide detailed results for the regression models. The
regression model for each period is described in a separate column. The dummy variables for judges, Judge4 through Judge 14, appear in separate rows. The
dummy variables are nonsequential because some judges were excluded to ensure a random distribution, and consistent with ordinary coding practices for
categorical variables, one judge (Judge3) was omitted. Each cell reports the
coefficient and, below it in parentheses, the standard error.

absolute terms." Id. n.127.
261. Distance from the guideline range should always be either zero or a positive number, and a handful of cases were omitted due to logic problems, likely because the total sentence reflected consecutive sentences but the judge or the Commission recorded the guideline minimum and maximum for only one offense. The Commission codes a sentence of life
imprisonment as 470 months. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, VARIABLE CODEBOOK FOR

INDIVIDUAL OFFENDERS 64 (2009). For consistency, in calculating distance from the guideline range, I treated a guideline minimum or maximum of life imprisonment as 470 months
as well.
262. Hofer et al., supra note 47, at 312.
263. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSs SECTION AND
PANEL DATA 518-20 (2002).
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Table A4 reports detailed regression results for sentence length:
TABLE A4
Linear Regression Model Results
Sentence Length, Including Mandatory Minimums
Pre-Booker
74.38*
(5.43)

Post-Booker
59.99*
(6.74)

-31.19*

-2.72

-14.54

(9.28)
17.17
(9.60)
-9.32
(9.14)
-8.76
(10.12)
8.97

(18.45)
-

Judge9

(8.30)
-24.61*
(8.95)
-30.37*
(8.11)
-30.01*
(8.37)
-22.57*

-42.20*
(17.01)
-19.06
(14.90)
-13.66

(8.33)

(9.07)

(15.46)

Judgel0

-40.26*

2.49

-9.63

(8.48)

9.87

(16.21)

-23.90*

-26.32*

-39.60*

(8.37)

(10.05)

(14.90)

-31.51*

-6.98

-8.85

(8.11)

(10.12)

(15.11)

-30.28*

1.81

-45.90*

(7.71)

(9.84)

(16.79)

Number of cases

997

1007

258

R2

.031

.025

.061

.001*

.003*

.044*

Constant
Judge4

Judge5
Judge6
Judge7

Judgell
Judgel3
Judgel4

Significance
Note: * Significant at the .05 level
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Table A5 reports detailed regression results for sentence length for the subset of cases not governed by a mandatory minimum:
TABLE A5

Linear Regression Model Results
Sentence Length, Excluding Mandatory Minimums

Constant
Judge4
Judge5
Judge6
Judge7

Judge9
Judgel0
Judgell
Judgel3

Judgel4
Number of cases
R
Significance

IKimbrough/Gall
56.20*
(10.06)
-37.08*
16.30
-

Pre-Booker
36.96*
(4.99)
-6.86
(6.92)
3.28
(7.44)
-11.40

Post-Booker
34.68*
(5.61)
-5.54
(7.90)
15.57
(8.17)
-10.01

(7.06)
-2.12
(7.34)

(7.55)
-2.59
(8.28)

-30.73*
(13.37)

-3.21
(6.99)
-10.89

-2.57
(7.71)
11.19

-18.08
(13.37)
-4.81

(6.97)
-0.99
(7.28)
-9.10

(8.37)
-12.43
(8.24)
-0.36

(14.23)
-31.55*
(13.06)
-21.56

(6.97)
-11.02
(7.44)
721
.014
.368

(8.06)
2.80
(7.93)
632
.031
.021*

(13.06)
-20.88
(12.80)
143
.080
.180

Note: * Significantat the .05 level
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Table A6 reports detailed regression results for distance from the guideline
range:
Table A6
Linear Regression Model Results
Distance from the Guideline Range, All Sentences

Constant
Judge4
Judge5
Judge6
Judge7
Judge9
Judgel0
Judge ll
Judgel3
Judgel4
Number of
cases
R
Significance

Kimbrough/
Gall
4.16
(5.41)
12.78
(8.66)
-

Mandatory
Guidelines
1.66
(1.76)
2.39
(2.60)
0.88

PROTECT
Act
3.77
(2.77)
-1.97
(4.06)
-1.95

PostBooker I
8.48*
(3.14)
5.09
(4.14)
5.13

PostBooker II
9.88*
(3.78)
2.29
(5.26)
-1.34

(2.82)

(4.09)

(4.56)

(5.13)

3.27
(2.57)
2.95
(2.84)
3.98
(2.69)
3.76

0.18
(3.89)
0.79
(4.12)
6.20
(4.06)
-1.83

0.18
(4.24)
3.13
(4.74)
-6.63
(4.14)
-4.13

-1.90
(5.11)
1.36
(5.29)
-5.04
(5.11)
14.19*

6.67
(8.36)
20.00*
(7.22)
10.80
(7.91)
8.34

(2.74)

(4.03)

(4.45)

(5.60)

(7.73)

4.57
(2.72)
3.26
(2.63)
3.41
(2.46)
491

3.65
(4.12)
-0.71
(4.09)
4.16
(3.80)
356

-2.09
(4.70)
2.14
(5.08)
-0.65
(4.53)
419

5.00
(5.56)
-1.29
(5.18)
-3.53
(5.38)
453

15.54*
(7.38)
1.14
(7.33)
0.58
(8.24)
215

.010
.847

.024
.482

.036
.089

.037
.048*

.066
.073

Note: * Significantat the .05 level
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Finally, Table A7 reports detailed regression results for distance from the
guideline range, using only "discretionary" sentences:
TABLE A7

Linear Regression Model Results
Distance from the Guideline Range, Discretionary Sentences

Constant
Judge4
Judge5
Judge6
Judge7
Judge9
Judgel0
Judgell
Judgel3
Judgel4
Number of

Kimbrough/
Gall
5.20
(6.51)
19.47
(10.93)
-

Mandatory
Guidelines
2.24
(2.29)
3.60
(3.43)
0.58

PROTECT
Act
4.90
(3.58)
-2.36
(5.37)
-2.59

PostBooker I
9.53*
(3.78)
9.33
(5.19)
5.68

PostBooker II
11.81*
(4.57)
4.66
(6.56)
-1.44

(3.46)

(5.26)

(5.43)

(6.23)

4.41
(3.34)
3.40
(3.58)
4.57
(3.38)
4.82
(3.52)
5.86
(3.46)
4.53
(3.43)
3.61
(3.09)
384

0.20
(5.03)
1.44
(5.44)
9.84
(5.44)
-2.23
(5.26)
6.40
(5.58)
-0.21
(5.26)
4.05
(4.77)
269

2.41
(5.31)
5.08
(5.84)
-7.09
(5.13)
-3.23
(5.67)
1.89
(6.44)
3.62
(6.23)
0.28
(5.48)
319

-0.59
(6.42)
3.07
(6.56)
-5.66
(6.26)
18.08*
(6.84)
9.37
(7.06)
-1.28
(6.30)
-2.91
(6.78)
349

7.80
(9.94)
23.43*
(8.59)
13.08
(9.46)
10.59
(9.33)
22.01*
(9.10)
0.92
(8.66)
0.80
(9.94)
172

.013
.835

.036
.384

.045
.105

.051
.038*

.094
.037*

cases

R
Significance

Note: * Significantat the .05 level

2.

Alternative time periods

For the sake of completeness, the tables below summarize alternative regression models based on slightly different methods of dividing the 2002-2008
sentences into periods.
As discussed above, a five-period division is preferable for guideline sentencing outcomes. The PROTECT Act in 2003 was explicitly intended to reduce the rate of downward departures from the Guidelines, and changes in appellate precedent in the years following Booker are thought to have influenced
district courts. Combining pre-Booker and post-Booker sentences into a single
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period therefore risks missing the effects of relevant legal changes.
Nonetheless, Table A8 reports the results for regression models using the
same three-period division used for sentence length:
TABLE A8
Linear Regression Models
Identity of Judge and Distance from Guideline Range, Three Periods

Pre-Booker
Post-Booker
Kimbrou h/Gall
Pre-Booker
Post-Booker
Kimbrough/Gall

%Variance

Avg. Variance

Model

Expand

Explained

Sigificance

1.2%

1.7 months

.338

1.7%
6.7%

3.0 months
7.1 months

.095
.073

1.5%

2.1 months

.346

2.7%

4.2 months

.031*

9.4%

9.1 months

.037*

Note: * Signficantat the .05 level

The results do not differ in any meaningful way from the models reported
in the main text.264 Both sets of models indicate that, before Booker, the relationship between the identity of the judge and distance from the guideline range
was weak and not statistically significant. Both time periods also indicate that
the strength of the judge effect increased after Booker, and increased sharply
again after Kimbrough and Gall. If anything, the three-period models suggest
an even more dramatic shift, with the strength of the relationship in the most
recent period more than five times pre-Booker levels for all sentences, and
more than six times pre-Booker levels for discretionary sentences.
For sentence length, as discussed above, a three-period division is preferable. Longer periods benefit the analysis in two ways: (1) by ensuring a larger
number of cases per judge, which is central to the reliability of a natural experiment; and (2) by increasing the chances of identifying a statistically significant judge effect, since statistical significance is highly sensitive to sample size.
And because neither the PROTECT Act nor any court decision in the years
immediately following Booker directly affected sentence length, the threeperiod division does not omit any potentially material legal changes. 265

264. See supra Table 3 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
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Nonetheless, Table A9 reports the results for regression models using the
same five-period division used for guideline sentencing outcomes:
TABLE A9

Linear Regression Models
Identity of Judge and Sentence Length, Five Periods
Model
Significance

%Variance
Explained

Avg. Variance
Explained

Mandatory Guidelines
PROTECT Act
Post-Booker 1
Post-Booker II
Kimbrough/Gall

4.5%
4.7%
3.8%
2.2%
6.1%

13.2 months
13.3 months
14.1 months
9.7 months
15.5 months

.001*
.028*
.028*
.264
.044*

Mandatory Guidelines

5.0%

9.7 months

.008*

PROTECT Act

4.4%

8.6 months

.195

Post-Booker I
Post-Booker II

6.1%
4.4%

10.7 months
10.0 months

.028*
.104

Kimbrough/Gall

8.0%

10.3 months

.180

Note: * Significantat the .05 level

As expected, the shorter periods introduce greater uncertainty by making
more of the models nonsignificant. Like the three-period models, these models
indicate that the strength of the judge effect has increased after Booker. Each
set, however, sends somewhat conflicting signals.
For all sentences, the models reveal a stronger judge effect in the Mandatory Guidelines (4.5%) and PROTECT Act periods (4.7%) individually than in
the combined Pre-Booker period (3.1%).266 They also show a substantial dip in
the judge effect during the second eighteen-month period after Booker. The
bottom-line finding remains the same: after Kimbrough and Gall, the judge effect is statistically significant and stronger than in any pre-Booker period. But
the change appears more modest: 30-45% above pre-Booker levels rather than
100% above pre-Booker levels.
For sentences not subject to a mandatory minimum, three of the five models are not statistically significant, including models for the PROTECT Act period and two post-Booker periods. That makes comparisons hazardous. The
general trend appears similar: the judge effect grew stronger in the eighteen
months after Booker than during any previous period, and grew even stronger
(although not yet statistically significant) since Kimbrough and Gall. But again,
the change appears more modest: 60-80% above pre-Booker levels rather than
266. See supra Table 1 and accompanying text.
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several times pre-Booker levels. 267
These alternative models reveal that, to some extent, the change in interjudge sentencing disparity depends on the point of reference. Although shorter
periods introduce considerable noise, comparing a narrow slice of pre-Booker
sentences with a narrow slice of post-Booker sentences can make the change in
inter-judge sentencing disparity appear smaller, or even disappear. The naturalexperiment method, however, depends for its reliability on a sufficient number
of cases per judge. The Hofer, Waldfogel, and Anderson-Stith-Kling studies
used periods of at least two years, and as many as six years.268 The main text
therefore relies, where possible and appropriate in light of the underlying legal
changes, on longer period lengths.

267. See supra Table 2 and accompanying text.
268. See Anderson et al., supra note 23, at 290-91 (two years before the Guidelines, six
years after); Hofer et al., supra note 47, at 284 (two years); Waldfogel, Empirically Based
Sentencing, supra note 55, at 295 (four years).
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